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Important work was done on Greek hagiography by A. J. M. Ehrhard. Of interest to wider circles are the series published (in German) by W. Nigg and W. Schamoni (*Heilige der ungeteilten Christenheit*, 1962ff.); cf. W. Nigg, *Warriors of God* (1959); also the edition in 4 vols. of A. Butler's *Lives of the Saints* (1956), critically revised by H. Thurston and D. Attwater.

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Ekkart Sauser

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I. Universal Salvific Will. II. Biblical Concept. III. History of Salvation ("Salvation History"): A. Theological Analysis. 1. Biblical Approach. 2. Theological Explanation. B. The Old Testament Period. C. The New Testament Period. IV. Theology: A. Redemption. B. Satisfaction. C. Soteriology.

I. Universal Salvific Will

1. *Introduction.* The Christian doctrine of God, his infinite goodness and holiness (*D* 1782f.) and that of the total origin of all other reality from God by creation imply the fundamental Christian conviction that in itself the whole of reality is (objectively) "good", i.e., that it must be positively accepted as meaningful and worthy of love, in that fundamental act of our existence (in knowledge and love) which is known to us from our experience. On the other hand, in the Christian conception of human existence we are aware that the directly experienced, heterogeneous reality (of man and of the world) is finite and can only be affirmed with the appropriate reserve. The ontological difference between God and what is not God is prolonged into the very act of adopting an attitude to reality (if this is not to become an immoral and self-contradictory idolatry of cosmic reality). Moreover, there is in man, and consequently in the world, the mystery of sin and guilt,

and consequently of evil and the absurd. These two fundamental facts cannot positively be seen to be compatible. Their compatibility is only to be assumed in the unconditional act of acknowledgment of God, of absolute goodness. For these two facts do really exist and the acceptance of their compatibility, without in any way ideologically arguing away one of them in favour of the other, involves the acceptance of man's createdness, of his not being God. For since man is not the radical centre of reality, he cannot understand reality from the sole point from which in its unity all is intelligible. From this, two consequences flow.

a) The proposition that "everything is good" does not entail the invulnerability, nor even an ultimate and unquestionable security for the individual's personal life. Man's existence is threatened at its ultimate root (see *Sin*) and at its possible definitive condition (see *Hell* I). Moreover, even in the decision of his very freedom as such and despite the impossibility of shifting his responsibility for his choice to the holy God when it is evil, man must know that he is comprised within the sovereign will of God, which cannot be put in the balance with the will of a creature. Consequently the vulnerability of his personal life means that he has to endure a situation of uncertainty as to whether God will finally be good and merciful to him, this particular individual. Of course we can and must draw the distinction between the antecedent, conditional will of God and his consequent, unconditional will. We can say that God in his antecedent (though conditional) will is certainly good to me, a particular individual, and that the only uncertainty is whether I, the individual in my freedom, will freely decide for God. We can say that that is why it is uncertain in my own particular case whether God will be good to me and will (i.e., can will) my salvation in that unconditional will of his which follows my decision. But this does not explain the relation between the meaningfulness of the good God, of his will and of non-divine reality on the one hand, and the absurdity of (moral) evil and its consequences (including possibly its irremediable consequences) on the other. It does not bring man peace by presenting him with something he understands and therefore has within his grasp. It may be held that one cannot speak absolutely in the strictest sense of a

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will of God as consequent upon a created reality. The Thomist school in fact explains this consequent will as referring only to a series of *signa rationis* within God, and makes it antecedent to any foreseen created reality. But even if this is left out of account, the uncertainty of the situation in regard to salvation is not removed by the classical distinction of antecedent and consequent will, correct and inescapable as it is.

In the first place, created freedom in its evolution (to which the uncertainty of the relation to the good God is transferred) remains impenetrable for the person reflecting on it. There is an uncanny threat there. Furthermore, the free subject knows of course that despite his freedom and precisely in his freedom, he is at the sovereign disposition of God, however little this may permit of his transferring his own responsibility to God. Where and when freedom accepts God's proffered salvation, this acceptance is itself an effect of the gratuitous grace of God (*D* 176f., 182, 193, 300, 322). The "antecedent" will of God itself, as good, is therefore once again intrinsically differentiated, as is shown by the common theological doctrine of the difference, effected by God himself, between merely sufficient and efficacious grace. And so it too becomes impenetrable. Whether even the antecedent will of God is in fact such that it establishes the ultimate and definitive meaningfulness of existence for the particular individual, no one can affirm absolutely on the theoretical plane, on the basis of the principle of the meaningfulness, the goodness, of reality generally.

b) This affirmation being impossible on the theoretical plane, some conception of the relation between meaning and absurdity (for us) in the domain of the non-divine has to be formed in some other way, because after all it is necessary to have some positive position regarding the question itself: I have to *hope*. This shows that hope, i.e., living by what is not rationally fully demonstrated, is a fundamental mode of human existence. Hope is not simply a self-evident, derivative function of cognition (including "philosophical" faith). It can only be shown philosophically on principle that there must be hope, but that does not make hope a secondary function of philosophical insight (in philosophical faith). For the concrete hope of a particular individual for *his* salvation (the ultimate goodness and meaningful-

ness of his unique existence) is indeed rendered legitimate before the tribunal of reason by such insight, but it cannot be constituted by it. It cannot provide the ground of hope, which is the efficacious salvific will, efficacious in the particular case, originating in God alone and remaining hidden in him.

2. *Fundamental basis.* This being presupposed, a real, genuine conception of God's salvific will has to be attained in faith. This will is the ground of hope precisely as hope, and this ground is only concretely attained in the act of hope itself. Hope, like every salutary act, has its ground in the "transcendental" capacity bestowed by grace, and also in the "categorical", historical call to hope, which comes in the offer of salvation through Christ, in the experience that "hope does not disappoint us" (Rom 5:5), and in the knowledge that such hope has already been realized in Christ's resurrection.

3. *Scripture and magisterium.* According to Scripture, God's salvific will is not identical with his metaphysically necessary goodness and holiness, nor something strictly derived from this. It is not a metaphysical attribute of God which can be attested everywhere and always, but a divine attitude in the nature of an event, which has to be experienced and proclaimed in history. This free attitude of God, which is directed towards the salvation of every man, has only become a manifest principle, definitively and irrevocably, in Jesus Christ, but the individual experiences it as such only in hope. (If anyone thinks he can be sure from inner experience of this salvific will of God, the experience is due to the interior grace of Christ.) All have one saviour (1 Tim 4:10), all are enlightened (Jn 1:29; 3:16f.; 4:12; 8:12; 1 Jn 2:2). The classical text for the universal salvific will of God is 1 Tim 2:1-6. Other relevant passages are Mt 26:28 par.; Mk 10:45; Rom 11:32; Mt 23:27; Lk 19:41. Although Scripture praises in this way the mighty power of the merciful will of God, which comprises all and powerfully transcends sin (cf. Rom 5:17f.; 11:32), it has no theory of an apocatastasis. It leaves man confronted with two possible final states of his history, in salvation and perdition (Mt 25:31-45 etc.). It commands man to hope for himself and for all, but forbids him the certainty which would supersede "mere"

hope by giving knowledge of what the comprehensive and definitive actually is. Consequently the magisterium only recognizes the intermediate position which hope can occupy between the doctrine of God's universal salvific will and ignorance of the concrete outcome of history for the individual as such. Christ died for all men, as the Creeds affirm. All the justified receive sufficient grace to avoid every formally (subjectively) grave sin and so attain their salvation (*D* 804, 828, etc.). It would be heresy to assert that Christ died only for the predestined (*D* 1096 etc.) and a theological error to say that he died only for believers (see *Atheism*) or that pagans, heretics, etc., outside the Church do not receive any sufficient grace (*D* 1294, 1376, 1646, 1677; Vatican II, *Lumen Gentium*, art. 16).

While therefore the absolute universality of God's salvific will in regard to all men (who come to the use of reason) has not yet been solemnly defined (as a result of the history of the development of dogma), that universality can nevertheless no longer be denied, all the more so as Vatican II envisages the possibility of salvation for "pagans" (*Ad Gentes*, art. 3) and even for those who inculpably have not yet attained an explicit recognition of God (*Lumen Gentium*, art. 16). No official pronouncement has been made on the question whether infants dying without baptism are also comprised in God's saving will (see *Limbo*). (A positive answer is to be given.) On the other hand the doctrine of apocatastasis is rejected (cf. *D* 209, 211). There is no positive predestination to damnation or to sin, antecedent to man's own guilt (*D* 160a, 200, 300, 316f., 321f., 514, 816).

4. *Tradition*. In the Greek and other Fathers before Augustine there is in principle no doubt about the universality of God's salvific will, though the concrete possibility of salvation outside the Church and baptism was scarcely made clear. The later Augustine (at least after 418) no longer recognized in theological theory a universal salvific will for the *massa damnata* of fallen man. God wills to manifest his just judgment by leaving many in the inherited ruin of sin. Fulgentius teaches the same. Prosper of Aquitaine once more teaches the universality of salvation, for this aspect of Augustine's doctrine was never regarded as binding (*D* 142, 160a-b). A not inconsiderable undercurrent can also

be detected in the Fathers in favour of the apocatastasis of all. Later the principle of the universality of salvation on God's part remained in essentials undisputed. Exceptions are the priest Lucidus (5th century) and Gottschalk of Orbais. Only in the later Middle Ages (Thomas Bradwardine, Wycliffe and Huss) and in the theology of the Reformers (in Calvin but not in the Confession of Augsburg or in the Formula of Concord) and in Jansenism, was it thought that the supreme sovereignty of the will of God, the manifestation of his justice and the irresistible might of grace can only correctly be maintained by thinking in non-universal terms of salvation and by teaching as a consequence a positive predestination to damnation antecedent to fault (predestinarianism). In this question Karl Barth abandoned the classical teaching of Calvinism.

5. *Systematic theology*. a) This seeks to systematize the teaching of Scripture and tradition by means of the distinctions between conditional and unconditional, antecedent and consequent will of God. The universality of God's salvific will is construed to mean his antecedent and conditional will which need not necessarily apply to his consequent and absolute will. The various theological theories disagree, however, on the nature of divine predestination, and dispute as to the point at which these two "wills" are distinct (merit and fault of man or the will to manifest divine justice).

b) In expounding the universality of God's salvific will, it is said that God repeatedly gives every sinner, unbeliever and hardened person, the at least remotely sufficient grace to attain salvation, so that this is even more the case as regards the justified, believers and those who inculpably have not yet come to believe. The question how God's salvific will can be serious and attain its purpose, when apparently not only baptism and membership of the Church, but also actual faith are, inculpably, not possible, has not yet received a comprehensive and clear answer (see *Atheism*, *Baptism* II).

c) A special problem is set by the question whether and how children who die in infancy without baptism, neither through their own fault nor that of others, are individually comprised in God's universal salvific will if, as the almost universal opinion of the theologians holds, they are without supernatural beati-

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tude (cf. *D* 693, 791, etc.) in Limbo (*D* 1526). The question of the condition of these children, and therefore of God's salvific will for them, has not found a really satisfactory answer, because it involves too many unknown factors. An answer is probably not to be expected because it calls for knowledge which is of no profit for Christian action.

d) God has empowered us and laid the obligation on us (in Jesus Christ and his experienced grace) of hoping for final salvation for all men, whom we must love, and consequently for ourselves. This means that we are to affirm the saving will of God which is implied and as it is implied in this act of hope. Hope here of course is meant in the sense already described, of an absolutely fundamental act of personal life.

e) That means that because hope has its ground in the eschatological saving event of Jesus Christ, his death and resurrection, salvation (as goal of hope and so of God's saving will) is in general (in the perspective of hope) not one of two possibilities, with the other, that of perdition, standing on an equal level with it, so that the free creature autonomously chooses between them. Existentially and ontologically the morally evil decision is not even formally on the same plane as the morally good decision. God by his own sovereign efficacious grace has already decided the totality of the history of freedom (which forms the domain within which the individual's free choice is made) in favour of the salvation of the world in Christ, and in Christ has already promulgated this event. Without detriment to its freedom the world as a whole is "conquered" and delivered by the love of God. That is the saving will of God with which Christian hope is primarily and fundamentally concerned.

f) On that basis alone there is no justification for speaking of a double predestination on an equal footing. It is impossible because in any case a consequent predestination (*post praevisa demerita*) already "presupposes" the creature's free refusal, which cannot be attributed to God (however impenetrable this impossibility may be from the ontological point of view) in the same way as the free Yes of the creature (as a manifestation of efficacious grace) must be referred back to God in praise and glorification of the grace of God. And it is impossible above all because the Christian (without of course being certain on this account of his individual salvation and so rendering hope

superfluous) encounters God as one who wills the salvation of all men. In the concrete he cannot stand outside this situation without falling into an abstract formalism where the ground of hope can no longer be found — unless of course one were to consider egotism itself a sufficient reason for hope rather than despair.

In the case of a double and equal possibility of predestination and in mistrust of his own freedom, man would have just as much reason to despair of salvation as to hope for it. The concept of "consequent predestination to damnation" and the distinction between efficacious grace and merely sufficient grace do not limit God's concrete salvific will which man encounters and must encounter in hope (cf. *D* 1296). They are secondary means of making it clear that man encounters this saving will in *hope* and not in theoretical certainty, and that he may not attribute to God the shipwreck of hope which is to be feared. But that does not mean that in hope as such he encounters a doubtful or limited saving will of God or his hope can be any but a firm one (*firmissima spes*: *D* 806). A theoretical system of double predestination on the same level is also ill-founded because in the eschatological situation of Christ we know with certainty that there are those who are saved, but we must only fear (we do not know) that there are those who are lost. But precisely this fear which confronts a genuine and for us undeniable possibility, but one which is not demonstrated by its fulfilment, commands man to hope in the saving will of God. For this has already taken effect, even though it remains theoretically indemonstrable that it is effectively operative in one's own case.

g) It is evident that a human being, inasmuch as he hopes (with love), encounters the real, efficacious saving will. He is not meeting a will which carries a real possibility of damnation side by side with it, but one which excludes the possibility of a double predestination. But we can never tell ourselves with certainty whether we are really hoping. We cannot as it were step out of ourselves and look at ourselves from outside. We can only tell ourselves we hope by *hoping*, that is, by taking refuge in what is beyond our control. Hope creates its object because it is created by it. That is not a cheap paradox but simply another way of expressing the fact that one can only hope when this hope in God's saving will, which is God

himself, is supported by God's prevenient, efficacious grace, which itself once again is God himself. It states the fact that hope (in love) hopes that the real saving will of God is truly operative, that it operates by being hoped for as incalculable. God's salvific will acts by causing it to be hoped for precisely as what is the incalculable. Because the salvific will wills a salvation which is God himself, he has made a creature to attain it.

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Karl Rahner

II. Biblical Concept

1. The Hebrew expressions corresponding to the English word "salvation" show that the OT concept of salvation had its roots in concrete experiences and situations. Salvation for the psalmist is deliverance from mortal danger, healing in sickness, liberation from captivity, ransom from slavery, help in a law-suit, victory in battle, peace after political negotiations (Ps 7:11; 18:28; 22:22; 34:7, 19f.; 55:17; 69:2; 86:2; 107:13, 19, 28, etc.). This experience is also shared by the nation as a whole. As soon as Israel was conscious of itself as a nation, it understood its exodus from Egypt as the decisive saving action of Yahweh; God had become his people's salvation (Exod 15:2; cf. 14:13, 20). The outstanding men in the history of Israel, such as judges (Jg 2:16, 18; 9, 15, 31; 6:14; 13:5; 1 Sam 7:8) and kings (1 Sam 9:16; 11:9, 13; 14:45; 23:5; 2 Sam 3:18) delivered the nation from distress and oppression and were regarded as instruments of God's saving action. But the biblical writers emphasize the predominant importance of Yahweh as the giver of salvation. Thus

Gideon may lead only 300 men into battle so that the people may ascribe its deliverance to God and not to its own strength (Jg 7). Isaiah emphasizes: "He (Yahweh) became their Saviour" (Is 63:8f.; cf. Hos 13:4; 14:2ff.).

The experience of salvation as a concrete manifestation of help for the individual or the whole nation assumed a new form in the message of the prophets. After the destruction of Israel and Judah, salvation was viewed during the exile under the image of bringing home the "remnant". The home-coming becomes, like the exodus, a sign of God's saving action, cf. Jer 23:6-8. Israel and its life were spiritualized (Jer 31:7, 31-33). God is "salvation" (Is 12:2; 35). The newly granted salvation is realized in a kingdom of peace in which God reigns as king (Is 52:7). In the post-exilic period, there appears as well as God the figure of an actual bringer of salvation; cf. the prince of peace, Zech 9:9.

In contrast to the prophetic picture of salvation for all nations (cf. Is 45:22), the later books of the OT show the development of the idea that on the day of judgment, Israel can expect final salvation but the (pagan) nations which have oppressed Israel must expect final perdition; expressed in individual terms, the just are allotted salvation, the wicked perdition (Wis 5:2; Joel 3:5; Dan 12:1f.). This restriction of the idea of salvation to Israel appears even more strongly in the non-biblical books of Judaism, e.g. Jubilees, Psalms of Solomon, Enoch. They hold in common that the gentiles were really created only for destruction; cf. Becker, p. 36.

Whereas the OT prophets summoned Israel to repentance so that for its part it might create the necessary condition of salvation (cf. Is 30:15; Jer 4:14), there was a shift of accent in later Judaism. The *Torah* was regarded as a saving gift because with its help men could faithfully fulfil the commandments and thus acquire merit for themselves. God must pay them a well-earned reward in the next world (cf. Becker, pp. 19f.).

2. The Qumran community had not a consistent concept of salvation any more than the OT. The looked-for salvation was eschatological in character. When a decisive battle takes place in the last days between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness, salvation consists in victory over the en-

emies (gentiles) (1 *QM* [*War Scroll*], 6, 5f.; 18, 11), in the happiness of the good and in their rule over the rest of men (1 *QM*, 12, 12ff.; 19, 1ff.; *CD* 20, 33f.); salvation therefore is a state of earthly happiness.

According to another picture, man obtains a share in salvation when God pardons (literally "covers") his sins (1 *QH* [*Thanksgiving Hymns*], 2, 13; 16, 12; 1 *QS*, 11, 14). Salvation therefore consists to a greater extent in a sphere of conversion to God.

Whether it is a question of the eschatological battle or of purification from sins, salvation can never be obtained outside the community of Qumran. Only by strict observation of the rules within the community is the requisite conversion possible. Consequently the old antithesis no longer exists between pious Israelites and the rest of the world or Israel as a whole in contrast to other nations; the dividing-line now runs between the community on one side and those outside it on the other.

3. The NT uses for salvation the Greek term σωτηρία which can mean both bodily welfare and the corresponding state of spiritual life. In the NT the word salvation is a religious term and is almost never applied to purely earthly conditions (special context, Acts 27:20, 31, 34). Even where it is thought of as healing from illness, as help in a storm on the lake or as deliverance from mortal danger, it points to a profounder reality because of its connection with faith (Mk 5:23, 28; Mt 8:25; 14:30). In the light of biblical anthropology (body-soul totality) any healing is a sign of the bestowal of salvation by Jesus (cf. Lk 10:19; 18:42).

With Jesus, salvation has come to men, hence he says to Zacchaeus, "Today salvation has come to this house" (Lk 19:9). Salvation is often expressed by the image of the Kingdom of God. This is characterized by the fact that God's will is done (Mt 6:10). But where God is Lord, the dominion of Satan is at an end. This is indicated in particular by the driving out of demons by Jesus (Lk 11:20 par.; 10:18). Salvation is also manifested by Jesus' turning to sinners, the poor and the sick (Mk 2:1-12; Lk 7:36-50), whom he blesses in a special way (Lk 6:20f.); all who have strayed are received back (Lk 15). Because the content of Jesus' message is the salvation of men, the Gospel is called the "message of this salvation" (Acts 13:26; cf. 11:14), "the way of salvation"

(Acts 16:17), "the power of God for salvation" (Rom 1:16).

A wealth of ideas serve to describe the content of salvation; its present and future character is particularly to be noted. Present salvation is the situation created by Jesus' redemptive death: liberation from sin and the law (Rom 6f.; 1 Tim 1:15; Eph 2:1-10), forgiveness of sins (Acts 10:43; 13:28), divine sonship (Rom 8:14-17), justification by grace (Rom 3:24; cf. 8:29). Future salvation consists in deliverance on the Day of the Lord (1 Cor 3:15; 5:5), from the wrath of God (Rom 5:9; cf. Mk 13:13), in sitting down at table with the patriarchs (Mt 8:11f.), in eternal life in the world to come (Mk 10:30); the call to salvation is a call to "obtain the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ" (2 Thess 2:13f.; Rom 8:30). The Christian's earthly existence is lived in tension between these two aspects. The Christian shares in salvation even now by baptism, and yet he awaits its full realization at Jesus' coming in the Last Days (Heb 9:28; Rom 8:24; 13:11; Phil 3:20; 1 Thess 5:9; 1 Pet 1:5). Statements about the author of salvation are not uniform; both God (1 Tim 1:1; Tit 1:3; 2:10) and Jesus (Tit 1:4; 2 Pet 1:11; Heb 5:9; Acts 4:12) can be called "Saviour". Man of himself can effect no salvation; even faith (Rom 10:9ff.), conversion (Acts 3:19, 26; 5:31), baptism (Acts 22:16; 26:18; 1 Pet 3:21) and constancy in earthly life (2 Thess 2:10) acquire for him no "right" to salvation, but are only its necessary presuppositions. Salvation is not restricted to particular groups, as in the OT and in Qumran, but extends in principle to all men because of the universal efficacy of Jesus' death.

See also *Old Testament Theology, Qumran, Law I*; for the theological notion of salvation, see III, IV, below, *Grace, Resurrection*.

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Ingrid Maisch

III. History of Salvation ("Salvation History")

A. THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

1. *Biblical approach: The genesis of "history of salvation" as a scriptural concept.*

a) An exegetical investigation of the concept of "history of salvation" must examine the relationship of a purely political interpretation of events to a theological one, in the various biblical traditions. No event is "chemically pure", but presents itself with various meanings. Since this is so, instead of asking about "subjective" or "objective", one must inquire into the intention of the author, determining his chosen genre, his stylistic instruments and likewise his political, theological and social attitudes. This will make it clear that his presentation of events as directly or indirectly caused by God is not merely a subjective re-interpretation of events, but the application of a traditional category, transmitted socially, to the telling of historical events in general. The author could not have done otherwise, in view of the systematic schooling under which he had been brought up, or his political position, e.g., as a court theologian at Jerusalem. Hence the exegetical enquiry into the history of salvation is not a matter of comparing "sheer facts" with their theological interpretation. It means pinpointing the theological element and its influence in history as interpreted by an author or a tradition, and comparing it to other factors of historical interpretation. It will be seen that we are not dealing with the contrast between immanent and trans-immanent interpretation of history, since this alternative was unknown to the biblical writers. They do not regard the intervention of God in history as a breach of its continuity, just as they do not regard "miracles" as breaches of the "laws of nature". Their theological style of interpretation simply sees the permanent action of God in all events. In the light of this deliberately "slanted" presentation, history cannot but appear as the history of salvation and perdition. The tendencies are variable, but the concepts by which history is theologially interpreted in the OT, late Judaism and the NT have certain common elements of structure on the literary and theological level. Apart from a general Yahwism imposed on all the matter, the elements are as follows:

(i) There is a tendency to universalize

points of time. The theological interpretation is not applied just to one event (as for instance in the political appeals of the prophets) but is generalized as "patterns of history" — Yahwistic, Priestly, Deuteronomist.

(ii) There is a tendency to "archaeologize" and "eschatologize", which is a consequence of (i). The beginnings of the human race are presented by the Yahwist and the Priestly writings in the same way as the coming judgment on the enemies of Israel. This is then further developed in terms of a universal judgment.

(iii) There is a tendency to universalize in terms of space and persons. Notions of divine causality in the sequence of events are not applied simply to Israel and Palestine. All the nations are envisaged, at least as the ultimate horizon.

(iv) There is a tendency to see history in periods. In history as sketched by P for instance, it falls into periods according to the various covenants (with Adam, Noah, Abraham and Moses).

(v) There is the principle of attaching historical material to chosen (central) personalities. This is not the cult of personalities, but the standard process of the history of tradition, whereby originally alien matter crystallizes round great individuals. Thus we have, for instance, the "laws of Moses". These persons have mostly been called in a special way. (The literary genre of the vocation-narrative is applied.) This principle comes to the fore particularly in late Judaistic sketches of the history of salvation (e.g., Eccles 44-50).

(vi) There is in general a progressive tendency to eliminate anthropomorphisms. Thus in the Elohists, the apparition of Yahweh himself, as given in the Yahwist materials, is replaced by the coming of Yahweh's messenger, the "angel of God". This tendency is continued in the LXX. The aim is not to keep God free of the sphere of history. It is rather a transfer of political and diplomatic protocol to the heavenly court.

(vii) There is a tendency to aetiologize. Present conditions are traced to some blessing or calamity in the past, and thus based on God's dispositions in the past. Thus the question of the existence of evil is explained by the story of paradise and the fall, and commandments are deduced from the order of creation, as in Mk 10:5ff. par., *Jubilees*,

3, 8; 4, 32. In late Judaism the *Torah* is regarded as the treasure amassed throughout the generations of Israel's history. The blessed past survives there as an enduring record of it (cf. *Apocalypse of Baruch* [Syriac], 85).

(viii) There is the tendency to revive the past ("actualize") in the service of paraenetic instruction. The great deeds of God in past history are used to provide consolation in the present (Heb 6:13-20) and the fathers are put forwards as models of ethical conduct.

(ix) There is the principle of the historical connection between prosperity and the observance of the divine law. This schema was taken from "Wisdom" — the wise man prospers. The identification of wisdom and law gives rise to such sketches of history as those of the Deuteronomists and the Chronicler, which find this connection everywhere in the history of Israel.

(x) There is the tendency to typological presentation. New figures are described in terms of great traditional personalities who had a similar function. The great models are Adam, Abraham, Melchizedek, Moses, Aaron and David. The exodus from Egypt and the crossing of the Red Sea are constantly taken as images for new experiences of salvation. Writers use this method, along with the literary technique of allusions to or echoes of earlier writings and the schema of promise and fulfilment (and the reflective citation), to give a consistent picture of the history of salvation.

(xi) There is the tendency to affirm and bring out a continuity in the history of salvation (based on the "fidelity" of God to his promises to the patriarchs and to his covenants with the earlier figures).

A typical example of these procedures may be seen in the later tradition about Gideon as presented in Jg 6ff. (cf. Beyerlin). The traditional material speaks of a successful repulse of Midian intruders by the Abiezrites. The event thus depicted is then made the affair of the united tribes of all Israel and thus detached from its circumscribed local significance. It becomes an event which affects the twelve tribes (cf. tendency iii). Gideon's victory over the Midianites is then presented as a consequence of Yahweh's will to save which still persists (Jg 6:7-10; tendency i and viii). The event is presented as similar to the exodus from Egypt and Gideon is described with the traits of Moses (cf. Exod 3:9, 10 and Jg 6:13, 14; Exod 3:11 and Jg

6:15; Exod 3:12 and Jg 6:16; tendencies x and xi). These theological elements, which turn the story into history of salvation, primarily link the tradition to the great historical and theological complexes which made up the picture of the past as then seen by the cultic community of Israel. Older traditions of individual tribes had to be fitted into this centralizing schema. For the history of the cultic community of Israel, the exodus from Egypt was then regarded as the fundamental datum of salvation.

b) *The oldest sketches of a "history of salvation" and its "short creed"*. Basing himself on such considerations, G. von Rad singled out behind the confessional summaries of OT theology the following material kernel. There is a "short historical *Credo*" behind the traditions of the Pentateuch, which is the principle of the presentation. It embraced in a systematic time-schema the sequence of patriarchs, exodus from Egypt, desert wanderings and conquest of Canaan. This confession of faith was in use from ancient times, down to the time of Nehemiah (Neh 9). The main proof-texts are Deut 26:5-10; 6:20-24; Jos 24:2-13. But L. Rost has shown that Deut 26:6-9 is probably due to the Deuteronomist. W. Richter then showed that such systematizations are on the whole the product of a relatively late era and presuppose individual traditions which they systematize, but for which they did not provide a principle of presentation and composition. These propositions, which do not go back beyond the early monarchy, grow more and more obviously abstract and are purely theological constructions. The most frequent theological formula of this type is the "exodus formula", indicating that Yahweh (less frequently Moses) brought the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt. The verb is either עלה or יצא. According to Richter, the עלה-formula was associated with the holy tent (2 Sam 7:6), while the יצא-formula comes from the North. The formula is not older than the oracle of Nathan, the oracle of Balaam and J, where the formula does not occur in traditional material but in sections mainly formed by the Yahwist himself. The exodus-formula is not linked with Moses till E.

This formula was long understood as the fundamental assertion of Israel's history of salvation. But hardly anyone now supposes that there were twelve tribes in Egypt to be led out of it. And then, that the tribes which came out of Egypt bore the name of Israel is

as uncertain as whether a union of the twelve tribes could have been formed so soon after the conquest. But if "Israel" was not the hero of the exodus and only came later to be a cultic community, the creation of the "exodus-formula" can only have taken place at a much later period (cf. W. Richter). The formula is linked with the desert wanderings for the first time in Amos 2:9ff. and Hos 2:17. In Jos 24:2-13 the formalized statements concern only the exodus and the list of battles. Hence instead of a *Credo*, this is primarily a composition which takes in the sequence patriarchs, exodus, encampments in the desert, schematic list of battles and finally conquest of the land. Thus the schema of exodus and desert wanderings given in Amos is already considerably expanded in the text specially elaborated for Jos (no doubt Elohistic), and the traditions of the patriarchs are connected for the first time in a temporal sequence with the exodus traditions. Mic 6:1-5 can still be explained without supposing an underlying creed, but it is there in Jer 2:2-7, for the first time, with three members — exodus, desert wanderings and conquest of the land. Special emphasis is laid on Israel's being led to a fertile land. The expansion of the exodus formula into a creed at Jg 6:8 (or 8b)-10 is secondary (Deuteronomist-redaction). In the formulas of the Deuteronomists the possession of the land, promised to the patriarchs and then come true, becomes the most important of Yahweh's saving acts, obviously because of Jeremiah and the Deuteronomists the loss of the land had become once more a major menace, after the fall of the northern kingdom. The conquest-formula stems from the promises of the land made in the histories of the patriarchs. A link with the exodus formula is already forged by the Yahwist in Exod 3:8, 17, which thus for the first time orientates the complex of patriarchal narratives to the exodus from Egypt. Here the giving of the land is a transference from the promises to the fathers. But then, according to Richter, there is no historical creed underlying the passage which is rather "a theological penetration of traditions, whose main themes are fixed on for the first time and arranged in order" (p. 210). The Deuteronomists had recourse to this passage in particular when formulating the *Credo* for the conquest of the land, but were also influenced by Amos and Hosea.

c) *History of salvation as seen in J, E and P.*
In contrast to the successive stages of

reflection on history of salvation which could be traced in the growth of the short creed, the older strata of the Pentateuch already display an arrangement of materials which was only possible through the development of formulas and the thorough mastering of the subject-matter. And there are certain additions and compositions which follow one another in such a way as to suggest the thought of a temporal sequence. The individual strands of tradition were originally to a great extent independent of each other.

According to von Rad, we owe it to J that the tradition of the conquest was expanded by an insertion, an addition and a prelude: the Sinai tradition, the patriarchal tradition and the history of origins respectively. But since the patriarchal traditions originally saw the promise of the land fulfilled when the paternal gods were installed in the various sanctuaries, a conflict arose with the exodus narratives, according to which the land was given only after the deliverance of Israel from Egypt. But this conflict was also the reason why the patriarchal history was made part of the Pentateuchal tradition at all. The harmonization took the form of underlining the element of promise (of land and descendants) in the patriarchal traditions, while the element of fulfilment was eliminated from them and placed after the exodus from Egypt. This gave a theology of history embracing promise and fulfilment (M. Noth): the God of the fathers was identified with the God of the exodus and so all the narratives of the Pentateuch became a testimony to the one purposeful action of God in the history of salvation. Hence the theme of promise and fulfilment already embraces the basic compositional units of the Pentateuch.

Gen 12:1ff. then becomes the end of the history of origins and the key to it in J. The themes of "great nation" and "land" were already there in the patriarchal traditions, but the reference to "all nations" is typical of J (Gen 18:18; 27:29; 28:14) and has the function here of associating all nations with Israel: those who enter into fellowship with Abraham will be likewise blessed by God (J. Schreiner). Thus salvation becomes possible for all nations through the people of God, and Gen 12:2f. is the starting-point of the prophetic and eschatological texts which speak of the nations being converted to God (cf. Is 19:24). In the intention of the author, the text is connected with the theological problem of J, how to legitimate the bound-

aries of the empire of David. In this political perspective of the court-theologian the ancient territorial postulates of the patriarchal traditions are actualized. The programme of the Elohist historiography is clear from what are presumably its beginnings in Gen 15:4a, 5, 6, 13 (minus "400 years"), 14, 16, where 13-16 explains the future destiny of the children of Abraham. In E the patriarchs are models, and hence the faith of Abraham is stressed as the model of the faith of Israel. The emphasis is not on the possession of the land but on the destiny of the people of God. E understands the history of Israel as a history beginning with Abraham and as the history of the children of Abraham, according to the divine plan already revealed to Abraham (vv. 13f., 16). Faith and not the land plays the decisive role (cf. R. Kilian).

It is surmised that the historical work of P provides the basic lines for the present structure of the Pentateuch. It runs from the creation of the world to Shiloh, divided into periods by the covenants. It could be represented by the image of a pyramid, at the top of which is Israel's worship as the goal and climax of the whole creation. The presupposition of man's acts of worship and hence of the further interventions of God in human destiny is the fact that man was created in the image of God (Gen 1:26f.; 5:1).

d) *Concepts of history of salvation not confined to the Pentateuch.* Along with the above-mentioned schemas, there are a number of similar interpretations of the whole history of Israel or at any rate of major periods. The Deuteronomic history begins with Moses and ends in 587. It is focussed on the kings of Israel, in whose hearts the salvation or rejection of Israel was to be decided (von Rad), by virtue of their attitude to the law of Moses. The *Torah* of Moses and the Davidic royalty are the two elements which decide the fate of Israel. The catastrophe of 587 is the consequence of a series of violations of the *Torah*. The Chronicler's history goes from Adam to the period after Nehemiah. Here again the principle is that there is no sin without punishment, a very definite one for each generation. The Levites play a special role, including that of teachers of the law. A descendant of David is expected to appear in the future (1 Chr 17:11; cf. 2 Sam 7:12). The images of Moses and David are merged to some extent.

The prophetic concepts of the history of

salvation cannot be discussed in detail here (see von Rad, II). The outlines often follow closely those given above. Since the prophets stress the connection between apostasy from Yahweh and political disaster, threats and promises play a predominant role, mostly in the form of political expectations and probabilities for the near future. But while previous interpretations of history as salvation were orientated only to the past and related the present to the past, there is a fundamental difference in the prophets, inasmuch as their view of history is "eschatologized". The importance of this feature was first brought out by H. Gressmann. Here von Rad has rightly noted that God's action within history cannot be separated from his action at the end of history. While the prophets consider the time of the patriarchs and the exodus as a "saving period of history", they also interpret the present and the future disaster which looms on the horizon as the continuation, renewal and resumption in a much more powerful form of the same divine activity. The election and salvation of Israel are now made entirely dependent on what God will do in the imminent future. The new comes about in continuity with the old and hence on the analogy of the old. There will be a new Zion, a new David, a new covenant and a new exodus (Is 1:26; 11:1; Jer 31:31ff.; Hos 2:16f.; Ezek 20:33-38). The same categories as above continue to be applied to history of salvation (see on Jg 6ff.). But now the restoration of Israel in the fullest sense is expected from the future. In Jer and Ezek and also in late Judaism there is also the expectation of the gathering in of the twelve tribes, to be brought about by God or the new son of David or Elijah. Fundamentally, the ancient deeds of God are deprived of their actuality ("de-actualized", von Rad) by the new action in the future, and the relationship with the past is established by analogy and the concept of "remembrance" (זכירה). In late Judaism, the mention of the covenant with Abraham is linked with formulas which pray for deliverance from danger in such words as "Remember, O Lord, the covenant which you made with Abraham etc." The apocalyptic understanding of history of salvation is already foreshadowed in Gen 15:13f., where the divine plan is already laid down and is revealed beforehand to Abraham, God's elect.

e) *The function of history of salvation in the*

New Testament. The understanding of history in the NT is fundamentally on the lines of the prophetic and apocalyptic tradition and starts with the same principles. The categories of the history of salvation which Jesus and the Church applied to his person and message are all traditional. This may be seen in the oldest narratives from the life of Jesus, the passion narratives, which are wholly in the style of apocalyptic historiography, as for instance in the indirect use of Scripture. It also appears in the pre-Pauline, Hellenistic and Jewish-Christian "exaltation Christology", which is orientated on the notions of the giving of the Spirit and the new covenant and law in the heart, as in Jer and Ezek. Typology, using the figures of Elijah, Moses, Abraham, Adam and the prophets in general, plays a large part, even in the older tradition. Jesus' own understanding of history is determined by the imminent expectation of the kingdom, but also by the emphasis on the present decision for the message of repentance (see *Metanoia*). Salvation is decided by the attitude to God's envoy, Jesus (cf. Mk 8:38) and then to Jesus' envoys (Mk 6:11 par.). In the pre-Pauline Hellenistic tradition the decision with regard to the word of the envoys (see *Apostle*) is the way in which man himself anticipates the final decision as to salvation or perdition, because the resurrection of Jesus has brought on the final situation itself. But this means that with baptism (assimilation to the risen Lord) these Churches already possess the final blessings of salvation: peace, love, abrogation of the law, resurrection (2 Tim 2:18; *καινή κτίσις*, new creation) and knowledge of God by the gentiles (hence the mission to the heathen carried on by the envoys of Jesus). This notion of the end-time being already localized in the present, of which there are traces everywhere in the NT, especially in Jn, the pre-Pauline community at Corinth, in Paul and the synoptic missionary discourses, is what is really new in the notion of the history of salvation, from the point of view of religious history.

All later Christian theologies are essentially efforts to harmonize this radical conception current in the early post-Easter days with others which are more dependent on the cosmology of apocalyptic and only expect the moment of the end when heaven and earth actually pass away. The combination of these two currents gave rise to the "Al-

ready-Not Yet" of Pauline theology and to the later general Christian division of history into periods — the time before Jesus, the time of Jesus, the time of the Church and the time after the final judgment. This conception is well worked out in Lk, in which the time of Jesus is the "middle of the times", but also occurs in rudimentary stages which have affinities with the Pauline solution; cf. Lk 16:16f., where the message of the resurrection of Jesus (*εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*) has succeeded the OT word of God through the law and the prophets, and the mission to the heathens has begun (Lk 16:16b). Nonetheless, the law remains as the norm of judgment till the actual end of the world. Paul develops this approach, especially in his solution of the question of the law by primarily Christological categories. In the Letter to the Hebrews, the relationship between the resurrection and the last things is that Jesus appeared at his first coming in order to suffer, then became high priest and preceded the wandering people of God (E. Käsemann) of the two testaments into the heavenly sanctuary, and will appear a second time for his immediate work of salvation (9:28). Thus the various NT theologies give very different answers to the question of where salvation is. For Heb it is wholly in the future, since the present is still the time of promise, for Luke it is in the past in the time of Jesus, while for pre-Pauline and Johannine circles it is in the present possession of the Spirit. (Here U. Wilckens appeals to 1 Jn 3:2, where a future event is foreseen, but which obviously does no more than reveal what has already taken place.) Hence the relationship to the history of salvation up to Jesus is a matter of how radically the break brought about by the resurrection of Jesus is conceived. The continuity stands out most clearly in the texts which make use of the Deuteronomists' view of history to explain Jesus and his destiny (Mt 5:11f. par.; Mt 23:29–36 par.; Lk 13:31, 34f. par.; Mt 23:37ff.; Lk 11:49ff.). Here the death of Jesus is in line with the killing of the prophets, the destruction of Jerusalem follows the necessary pattern of punishment, the obduracy of Israel is the cause of its rejection and of Jesus' envoys' turning to the heathen (after the resurrection in Mt, after a second preaching of repentance in Luke's Acts). The working out of the reflective quotations in Mt (modelled in particular on the *Liber antiquitatum biblicarum* of the pseudo-Philo)

is also due to the use of a category long familiar to the theology of history — that of promise and fulfilment. When the proof from Scripture is later used against Judaism (e.g., Mk 10:5f.), the discontinuity between Israel and the Church of the nations is stressed. It means that the obduracy manifested at the crucifixion of Jesus has long been seen as applying to other fields. It is now seen in everything which divides Judaism from the Christian harmonizations of present and future eschatology.

See also *Old Testament Books I, Old Testament History, New Testament Theology II, III*.

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Klaus Berger

2. Theological explanation

a) *Preliminary considerations.* The history of salvation in general, and also the Jewish-Christian history of salvation and revelation is sometimes viewed — often with the help of a fundamentalist reading of Scripture — as a series of divine irruptions into history, in the course of which supernatural truths and moral imperatives are imparted by God through prophetic intermediaries. The history of salvation is treated as basically extrinsic, and then reduced to events within

the range of categorized thought and "clear ideas", even where the necessity of grace is implicitly and explicitly admitted for accepting propositional revelation in faith. But this view does not allow the same fundamental importance to the proper function of grace, the inward divine Pneuma, in the very constitution of salvation and revelation. It fails to note that the OT and NT history of salvation is not just authentic attestation of the Pneuma-event, but also interpretation of it, and as such, also part of the divine event. The attestation of the history of salvation in Scripture and the interpretation of it there are both always inspired by the same Pneuma to which the Scripture testifies.

Hence the theological concept of history of salvation cannot be content with a mere record of the actual course of Jewish and Christian history. And it is not enough to trace the various stages of reflection on the history of salvation as they appear in the OT and the NT, though it presupposes and includes such matters. The *theological* concept must throw light on the full horizon opened up by the revelation and salvation of the OT and NT: the identity as event of grace (Pneuma) and revelation, of the freedom (act) of God and the freedom (act) of man. This alone gives the essential concept which takes in the whole of mankind's history of salvation, before and outside the OT and Christianity, and links it with the history of salvation in Christ, where salvation and revelation come to their unique, eschatological and definitive climax. For here the transcendental self-communication of God to humanity in the Pneuma is absolutely and irrevocably identical with its historical coming in the God-man, who is at once God himself as given, the human acceptance of this gift and the final historical manifestation of this gift and acceptance.

There is also another reason why the theological concept of history of salvation cannot be a direct continuation of OT and NT reflection on it. The theological reconciliation of all religions (or all salutary experiences) of mankind with the history of salvation in Jesus Christ must envisage the OT and NT history of salvation as a whole, that is, as eschatologically at its goal. It is here that the hermeneutical principles must be applied in which its transcendental origin and its intrinsic conditions of possibility are brought to light. They are only knowable in this "event", because only fully real there.

In the analysis of the theological concept of history of salvation, historical statements and statements of principle have to be combined. This is a consequence of the inevitable dialectic of all human knowledge. Man knows his nature through experience of himself and his history. (This is to be understood throughout as an inter-personal dialogal understanding, not individualist or subjectivist, and not collectivist in the sense of a growing self-awareness of the collective consciousness of man.) And he necessarily interprets his historical experience in the light of his transcendental knowledge of being, which is in turn constantly modified or expanded by this experience.

b) *Definition and explanation.* (i) History of salvation, as understood in theology, is everything which happens in history with a positive or negative bearing on the final salvation of man. In the strict sense, the concept can only designate the historical action of God and man which makes for salvation (and not for ruin). But since in the Christian understanding of history of salvation, the ruin wrought by God (and only by him) is a factor in the achievement of salvation, the comprehensive notion of (*de facto*) history of salvation is more appropriate — in spite of the fundamental difference between salvation and ruin.

The general concept of history of salvation which takes in all blessing and disaster everywhere in human history, i.e., all salutary experiences of mankind, is justified by the fact that there is experience of salvation before, beside and even after the Jewish and Christian history, and because such experiences were certainly not merely “metahistorical”, but were historical manifestations of non-Christian religions. For man can only live out his transcendental relationship to God in historical acts, and these must involve communication, because of the social nature of man, and hence objectivation.

(ii) It is a doctrine of faith that the salvific will of God revealed in Jesus Christ extends to all men of all ages and places. In view of this universality, there must be such a thing as a “history of grace”, inasmuch as grace is offered to all men “on principle”. This grace-inspired dialogue between God and man has some of the character of history. It is based on the freedom of God and of man and does not necessarily ensue from the nature of man as a spiritual person. But it is not at once history in the full sense. The

grace as offered freely by God and accepted freely by man in faith and love, does not produce at once the element of the historical in the strict sense of objectivation, articulate expression and social communication.

(iii) This salvation is offered and assigned to all men, insofar as they do not culpably close their hearts to the offer. Hence the constitutives of all human existence include both the obligation to the supernatural goal of direct union with the absolute God at the consummation, and the real subjective possibility of attaining this goal by accepting the self-communication of God in grace and glory (cf. Vatican II, *Lumen Gentium*, art. 16). Thus offer and possibility of salvation are co-extensive with the history of human freedom.

(iv) But, furthermore, this offer of supernatural elevation which enables man to direct his spiritual dynamism towards the God of the supernatural life is not merely an objective state. It is not entirely outside the range of consciousness. Grace is rather a change in the structure of human consciousness. This does not mean the presence of a new object of knowledge but a change in the horizon within which all empirical realities are grasped, and of the ultimate direction of consciousness. The supernatural horizon being formal and *a priori*, it need not be attainable in articulate reflection or indeed without the definite light of propositional revelation. It need not be distinguishable from the transcendental horizon of the experience of being. It is not an object, but the implicit horizon within which the spiritual existence of man goes on. This orientation of knowledge and freedom beyond all given objects does not present itself in the guise of an object. But as transcendently present it is all the more emphatically comprehensive and universally effective — though nameless. It is the dynamism and transcendence of the spirit towards the infinity of the mystery of God. This dynamism really succeeds in attaining God, because God himself gives himself to it, in the Pneuma, inserting himself into it as the deepest force and legitimation of the transcendence in motion.

(v) This supernatural elevation of man which goes at once with the universal salvific will of God is a revelation, not in the sense of a verbal communication from without, but in the sense of a change in consciousness, the impact of the free grace of the personal self-

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communication of God. This undoubtedly merits the name of revelation, since it really and effectively contains, as grace, that which is ultimately the content of revelation given in propositions and human concepts. God is there in special intimacy to forgive and save, which is the way he is the salvation of man in his self-communication, in grace and in glory.

If man accepts his supernaturally elevated transcendence, the supernatural horizon, the "dimension in depth" of reality (P. Tillich), he accepts the revelation of God in the self-communication of the God revealed. But this is the act of faith, (though for the moment implicit), since it is the free acceptance of the truth of God as the self-communication of God.

(vi) This general revelation and salvation is "history" (see ii above), though in a broader, less strict sense. It is history because both on the part of God and of man it is an interpersonal, communicative act. And this basic supernatural situation of man — since he cannot be dualistically compartmentalized — must make an impact on history: in concrete religious forms, in self-understanding, in morality (which under the impulse of grace, in the salvific providence of God, tries for objective, religious statements), in worship, in religious fellowship, in "prophetic" protest against restriction to the natural, categorized world and against an ultimately polytheistic misinterpretation of this basic grace-given experience. The Christian understanding of the salvific will of God and supernatural graces thus provides a positive key to the history of religion in general.

c) The theological concept of the special history of salvation goes beyond that of grace and revelation sufficient for justifying faith. It means further that the historical consciousness and recognition of the salvific event is itself part of the history of salvation, and as such a part, and distinguishable from other historical events, is guaranteed by God. In the special history of salvation, God's historical word, which is itself a constitutive element of the history, has interpreted as salvation or ruin some conjuncture or series of events of profane history. The events thus interpreted are thus distinguished from the rest of history and become the special history of salvation, specifically known as such. Hence the saving acts of God only come into the dimension of human history as such and are themselves strictly historical, when

the word of God which narrates and interprets them is itself a constitutive element of God's saving acts.

Divinely inspired and historically tangible (hence expressible), this explicit knowledge of salvific history has in turn its own history — not only because saving acts and the corresponding experiences are deployed along the course of history, but because knowledge grows clearer. The special history of salvation is more and more clearly distinguished from the general in the conscious experience of it. In this historical process of interpretation by the words of God himself — the specific characteristic of the special history of salvation — God's offer of grace to man and man's more and more manifest acceptance of it move parallel on to the eschatological climax which determines the meaning and outcome of all history. At this point offer and acceptance of grace, and their interpretation by God's own words, attain their historical and indissoluble unity, in the person of the Word become man. Where therefore the history is definitely interpreted, as weal or woe, by the word of God, where God's saving acts in the general history of salvation are depicted with definite certainty, where the supreme unity of God, world and history in Jesus Christ is historically manifested by the express self-attestation of Christ, the special history of salvation is there without qualification. And it is thus also distinguished from world history. Without this ultimate identity of salvific action and historical interpretation in Jesus Christ, without his self-consciousness and self-attestation which make the *unio hypostatica* historically real for us as well as in itself, there are only "provisional" and deficient modes of the history of salvation and its interpretation. So too with its distinction from profane history. These modes are not so much *species* under a univocal generic concept as ascending phases of the one "nature" of history of salvation, which is only fully actuated in Jesus Christ.

d) *Special and general history of salvation.* The special history is rooted in the general, since the former, strictly speaking, only began with the Mosaic covenant. And this provides an aetiology in which its prehistory is traced back to the beginnings, and so deliberately merged into the general history. In the OT itself the boundaries between profane and sacred history are still fluid. OT man found it hard to distinguish false prophecy from

true, since there was no institutionalized court of appeal, with a divinely-assisted discernment of spirits, to say definitively what was true prophecy and legitimate religious criticism and reform, and what was false prophecy and perverted religious development. The people of God of the OT could apostatize from its divine call and obscure the special God-given historical tangibility of the salvific will of God for Israel, and hence obscure this sign of God's representation in the world. And revelation itself testifies that there were saving acts of God for other peoples, historically tangible, analogous to his action in the OT, though it was the privilege of Israel that its history of salvation was the immediate prologue to the incarnation of the Logos.

The special history of salvation is distinct from the general, but since before Christ all men were not called to the "provisional" special history of salvation, the existence of this distinct general history is not denied or said to be illegitimate (at least before Christ). But then the special history must be orientated to a climax in which in principle, though perhaps not *de facto*, the general history of salvation is absorbed in it. It follows that in the light of this climax all conscious, articulate statement of the general history of salvation becomes illegitimate and destructive if it is made really in the time of Christ and is still a refusal of the opportunity. Only in Jesus Christ is there absolute unity between grace and revelation, divine and human freedom. And in the self-revelation of Christ, this unity is historically present, taking in past and future in such a way that this sacred history is definitely and permanently distinguished from world history. So too is all that the Christ-event entails: Church, sacraments and Scripture all share in their own way in the finality of the Christ-event and its demarcation from world history. But by the very fact that the history of salvation is clearly and finally distinguished in Christ and the Church from world history, becomes definable within world history and there enables the general history of salvation to be explicitly and socially understood, the special history (with its words, society and sacraments) remains determinant for all men and all ages.

Since the salvific action of the Spirit is at work in general history of salvation, its progressive explicit absorption into the special history of salvation can be regarded

as positive growth for the latter, though this has reached its eschatological stage. The same is also true of contemporary history as it "still" runs on. The special history of salvation strives to absorb into itself the whole general history of salvation and revelation and be the historical presentation of it. Thus it strives to be one in action with the general history of salvation and hence with world history, though this identification is never reached in history, but only becomes reality when all history is consummated in the kingdom of God.

See also *Revelation I, II, Grace*.

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B. THE OLD TESTAMENT PERIOD

Here we are concerned neither with the OT as Scripture nor with the history of the people of Israel in detail but with the nature of the period in "salvation history" which is designated by the term OT (ancient covenant) as this is to be understood, in the light of the NT, from the

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sources of dogmatic theology. Theologically speaking, the OT is the phase of the history of revelation and salvation which began with God's covenant with Abraham, had its centre (as the prophets teach) in the exodus from Egypt and the covenant of the chosen people of Israel under Moses at Sinai, and came to fulfilment in Christ's death and resurrection and the new and eternal covenant of God with the whole of mankind which they constituted. This epoch in salvation history had an anterior limit because the history of origins and the time before Abraham are regarded by the OT itself (even in the Yahwist tradition) as "pre-history" of a general (universal) kind, in which a special ("particular") history of salvation does not yet stand out, that is, one expressly distinguished by God's revelation itself from the rest of world history and salvation history and in this sense "public". The OT period was closed by the new covenant in Christ Jesus. Spatially, the OT is limited, because grace cannot be limited to the OT, and with grace and in it, a revelation — apart from "primitive revelation" — though not strictly "public" and "official". This follows from Scripture itself (Ezek 14:14, 20; Jon; Ps 46:2f.; 101:16f.; 137:4f.; Mt 12:41; Jas 5:11), and the teaching of the Church (*D* 160 a–b, 1295; cf. also *D* 1379, 1647). And there is now the doctrine of Vatican II, especially in *Lumen Gentium* (on the Church), art. 16, and in *Ad Gentes* (on the Missions), art. 7, according to which it cannot be doubted that there is real and salutary faith even outside the OT and the NT preaching. On the contrary: wherever there is supernaturally elevating grace, there is a new formal object (motive) for knowledge and action and in this sense, a transcendental revelation.

Consequently, from the present-day standpoint this period is very limited. In view of the antiquity of mankind and therefore the lengthy duration of the "status legis naturae", and in view of the brevity and restrictedness of the history from Abraham to Jesus in comparison with the whole of world-history, it rightly seems to us today a relatively short immediate preparation for Christ. And in many respects (not in all) it has the appearance of a paradigm of God's action in history generally, which providence has specially emphasized in revelation. The OT may be more closely characterized by the following features.

1. It is genuine supernatural history of salvation and revelation (in "word"). Consequently, since the discontinuity of history through the fault of men's unbelief has no power to disrupt the unity of God's saving action, it is the irrevocable prehistory of the definitive revelation of God in Christ. Salvation is from the Jews (Jn 4:22), God in the OT "in many and various ways spoke of old" to the fathers by the prophets (Heb 1:1). The NT writings (Mt 15:3f.; Mk 7:8; Lk 24:44; Jn 5:46; 19:36f.; 1 Cor 10:11; Heb 7ff., etc.), and the teaching of the Church (against the various forms of Gnosticism, Manichaeism, etc.) repeatedly emphasize that the history of the OT derived from the God who has revealed himself definitively in Jesus Christ (*D* 28, 348, 421, 464, 706), so that the scriptures of the OT and of the NT have the same author (*D* 783, 1787). The rejection of rationalist attempts (e.g., in Modernism) to reduce the authentic history of revelation to a purely natural, universal history of religion (*D* 2009–12, 2020, 2090, etc.), is also a defence of OT history. It must of course be noted that the divine authorship of this history does not abolish the fact that God's saving will and illumination were also at work outside this official history of redemption. Even outside the OT there has never been a purely natural history of religion anywhere. And in Jesus Christ God and man received an inseparable unity such as never existed before even in the OT.

This authentic OT history of salvation essentially consisted in the first place, according to the testimony of the OT itself, in being the history of an ethical and prophetic monotheism produced, maintained and even more, renewed, by God's own intervention. As such it consisted of the proclamation of the "experiences", caused by God's actual action in history, regarding God's free "actions", which go beyond rational inference of the attributes he necessarily possesses. In the second place, this history was such that the one true and "living God" (because and although Lord of all creatures) himself willed by his action in history to enter into the relationship of a special covenant with the people of Israel. He was not simply a "national God" from the start and inalienably, merely a numinous personification on the natural plane of the nation itself (cf. Vatican II *Dei Verbum*, arts. 3, 14ff.). The two factors conditioned one another. Yahweh the God of the covenant was ever more clearly

recognized and honoured as truly the only God, and as opposed to mere henotheism of fact it was ever more profoundly grasped that the God *of the whole world* had concluded a special covenant precisely with this nation, so that the ultimate purpose of the particular covenant was to be a universal one, as the promise in the OT of the future conversion of the Gentiles proves (Gen 12:3; Is 2:2; 11:10ff.; 42:4ff.; 49:6; 55:4; Ps 21:28; 85:9; Jer 3:17; Zeph 2:11; 3:9; Hag 2:7; Zech 8:20). When fulfilment had come it was possible to recognize that the historical covenant of God revealing himself in freely-bestowed favour was to find its supreme accomplishment when the two partners in the covenant, God and man, were united in the God-man, so that the former covenant was a preparation for this.

2. The OT was a "particular" history of salvation and revelation. This restricted history is chosen by the God of history from the whole of history, which is also willed and ruled by him. He has not revealed himself to all peoples and made a covenant with them in this way. What this implies, both positively and negatively, has already been noted above. This particularism has a universal meaning: if in addition to history in general there is also a *history* of salvation (and not merely a situation in relation to salvation which remains the same for all at all times), and if the actual redeemer is not mankind as a whole, but mankind — as a whole, however — is redeemed by one man, then the temporal and spatial setting of this historically one and therefore spatially and temporally located redeemer necessarily has its own determinate historical limits. It is planned by God with the redeemer in view and so shares in the supernatural character of the redeemer himself.

3. It was a history of salvation open to the future, not a definitive history. This open and provisional character was not a feature of the OT simply because everything historical is by that very fact transitory and always a provisional step towards something new. Even as God's action, imposing an absolute obligation here and now, it was understood to have a preliminary, preparatory function (which was all it was to have, and certainly by its own fault is all it had). This was understood to belong to its own nature because what was final, the eternal covenant,

was still to come. Moreover, the ancient covenant, the existence of which was radically threatened by the moral infidelity of the nation, could and did fail, and God's fidelity which was greater for all that, even towards the unfaithful, as was slowly recognized, pointed to the new covenant, not the ancient. That was how the OT regarded itself and that is how it was interpreted from the standpoint of the NT. It was planned "from eternal ages" as a prologue to Christ. He is its secret entelechy (cf. Rom 10:4), manifesting itself, though still hidden, in the slowly developing expectation of the Messiah.

a) Consequently this period of the history of salvation is to be interpreted as "not yet eschatological". That is to say, God's free, radical and definitive, irrevocable self-revelation and self-communication in his word as victorious grace to the definitively accepted world is not yet seen in such a way that God has already given himself tangibly and irrevocably in the world. OT salvation-history was still in suspense between judgment and grace; the dialogue was still open and the conclusion had not yet been reached in the world (i.e., disclosed by an event) that the pardon of God and not man's refusal has the last word. Consequently the visible social form of this not yet eschatological salvation-history (i.e., the ancient covenant and the synagogue) could still be annulled by the unbelief of the human partner and so everything in it was still ambiguous and a revocable promise which could be made void. For that reason an OT sacrament was not an "opus operatum", i.e., there was no absolute and unconditional promise of grace on God's part (cf. *D* 695, 845, 857, 711f.). Since the OT was in this sense not yet the definitive reality but, precisely as something established by God in view of salvation, was subject to the temptation of regarding itself as absolute, a temptation to which through men's fault it succumbed, it was the covenant which was the "Law", requiring but not conferring the realities in view of which it made its demands (God's Spirit, his life, holiness and grace). It was merely external legality and Levitical sanctification, a servile bondage to what was other than God (the objective structures of the world, even the mediation of the Law by the angels), because it could not give what the world was really meant to be in the total order of salvation: participation in God's

self-communication by grace and beatific vision. It therefore left man in an intramundane condition, even if one sanctioned by God. When as such (though divine and holy) it encountered sinful man, without conveying grace (and precisely to that extent) it produced servitude, it became a goad of sin, it meant death and the service of perdition. But in this way (since God of course ultimately decreed the "holy" Law with a positively beneficent intention for the salvation of mankind), and through the hidden grace that was given with the Law, though it did not belong to it, the Law in fact became a guide towards Christ (cf. Rom 3:19f.), though Paul mostly envisages only the calamitous (shadow-like: Hebrews) role of the Law, which consequently appears rather as a "tutor" *until* Christ appears (Gal 3:24f.).

b) On the other hand the OT is a manifest movement, guided by God, towards definitive redemption, the "shadow" cast before (1 Cor 10:6; Heb 10:1), which is there because the reality is on the way and creates for itself its prerequisites. To that extent there was already grace, faith and justification in the OT (Mt 27:52; Rom 4; 1 Cor 10:1-5; Heb 11; 1 Pet 3:19), not through what differentiates it from the new and final covenant, but because it already bore the latter hidden within it. Anyone who trusted himself in obedient faith to the saving action of God which took place in the OT, to the incomprehensibility of the divine dispositions and their hidden intention (and such obedience to God's unfathomable providence belongs to the nature of faith), entered into that hidden unity of God's redemptive plan, and was saved by hope (in this sense) of the promised future redemption (cf. *D* 160b, 794, 1295, 1356f., 1414f., 1519f., 2123) found salvation through Christ even in the OT.

The dialectic which is constituted by the fact that the OT could introduce, by faith, which was always possible, into the reality which the OT itself was not, because it was provisional and only existed in virtue of what was to come, understandably made Christian theology waver in its verdict on the OT. (This was already heralded by the lack of a complete synthesis of the judgment passed on the OT by Jesus and Paul in the writings of the NT.) Much remained debated: whether the Patriarchs had already the grace of Christ, the value and meaning of circumcision and other OT sacraments, the precise

principles of interpretation of the OT scriptures, the enduring validity or abolition of the decalogue, the differing "scale" of grace in the OT and the NT, the range of the content of faith (Trinity?) in the saints of the OT, the beginning of the "Church" in the OT (for example, from Abel onwards), the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit in the just of the OT, the precise nature (and limits) of God's authorship of the OT law, the exact moment of the abolition of the OT, when it became not only "dead", but "deadly", and so on.

4. It is a period in the history of redemption which is now fulfilled and ended by its fulfilment. Jesus said that his coming did not abolish the law but "fulfills" it (Mt 5:17) (by giving a radical character to the concrete demands of the OT law [Mk 10:1-12], by bringing it back to its essential core [Mt 22:34-40], and in that way finally abrogating the ceremonial law [Mt 7:15]) and cancelled the ancient covenant as such in its entirety in his blood (Mt 26:28 par.; cf. Lk 16:16). But Paul, without distinguishing between ceremonial law and moral demands, declared the ancient covenant ("the Law") to be abrogated, so much so that to continue to observe it as of importance for salvation amounts to denial of Christ and the unique significance of his Cross for salvation (Gal 5:2, 4). That abolition does not make the real past simply non-existent for Christians. Abraham is the father of all believers (Rom 4:11). The patriarchs of the OT are witnesses to the faith even for us (Heb 11). But so too are all other just men who, though more anonymously, are members and bearers of the whole history of salvation, extending beyond the OT, on which as a whole our salvation rests. That history is enduringly our own actual past. Seeing that the ontological and existential difference of the various realities involved has to be respected, it is not very easy to say what "still" remains because the OT is our valid past and what has simply been swept away because otherwise it would be denied that the ancient covenant is really past. The Law belongs to the second category; the holy Scripture of the OT, which is still our holy book too, belongs to the first.

5. As the prehistory of the new and eternal covenant, in which the OT has been annulled yet incorporated, it can only

be fully and correctly interpreted from the standpoint of the new covenant, because its true nature is only disclosed (2 Cor 3:14) in the revelation of its τέλος (end) (Rom 10:4). To consider the OT merely as part of the "history of religion" would be a failure to recognize its supernatural character, as in Liberalism and Modernism. Attribution of a purely immanent significance to the OT (M. Buber), even if its special character as effected by God were recognized, would miss the truth that the OT only revealed its full nature in the NT, and that we cannot leave this out of account today, without missing the real conception which the OT had of itself, though of course that immanent OT conception of its own nature must be inquired into, to the extent that such a question can be propounded and answered by a later age.

See also *Word of God, World History, Covenant, Zionism*.

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C. THE NEW TESTAMENT PERIOD

1. NT history of salvation has two senses. The first is the time of Jesus Christ and the apostles, the primitive Church, which can be distinguished by some essential features from the post-apostolic Church, even though it is itself the beginning and the first period of the Church. The second is the period of the history of salvation which runs from the resurrection of Christ and Pentecost (taken

as one salvific event) to the parousia, the return of Christ.

The "new covenant" or NT in the first sense differs from the second in the following respects. It is the time in which Jesus Christ was among men "in the flesh". The Christian revelation took place and was "closed", being henceforth "merely" handed on in tradition. Scripture, the inspired testimony to the original Christian revelation, was written. The Church was given its constitution *iuris divini*. But in spite of these features, the distinction is secondary. The main thing is the NT in the second sense, since Christ remains present throughout the whole of this time of salvation in his Spirit. His life on earth only means the beginning of his parousia, in which the kingdom of God will come definitively and in full openness. Hence the following considerations are confined to the time of the NT in the second sense.

2. According to Scripture, the NT is a unique phase of salvation, clearly distinguished from the previous one and running till the end of history. For in the NT Jesus Christ (even according to the self-understanding of the pre-Easter Jesus) is the absolute mediator, the eschatological coming of salvation, in whose death the new (and eternal, 2 Cor 3:11) covenant between God and all mankind is established (see *Eucharist* I). Scripture distinguishes this new covenant from the OT, partly by affirming its radical novelty and hence its opposition to the old, partly by affirming a certain continuity. From the first point of view, the NT, as the covenant of freedom from the law, of the Holy Spirit, of forgiveness of sins, of justice and the new fellowship with God, is distinguished by Paul from the OT, which is the time of the law and death, of the concealment of what the previous covenant really meant. From the point of view of continuity, the relationship of the NT to the OT is that of fulfilment to promise, but in such a way that the fulfilment surpasses the promise not only of the OT in the stricter sense of the Mosaic covenant, but of the whole history "since the beginning".

Scripture also shows why this strictly eschatological period cannot be succeeded by a new temporal period of salvation. The NT is radically open to the fulfilment. It is founded on the death of Jesus, the event which ends history, and on participation in

this death, and thus has already left behind any possible inner-worldly future. It hopes for the kingdom of God, which is God himself, from God alone, and thus is forbidden to confuse any inner-worldly future with the absolute newness already at work within it, and with regard to which it is itself only promise.

3. From the theological point of view, the NT is the eschatological time.

a) This means that in the matter of salvation the history of human freedom as such is no longer simply open, an endless dialectic (for man) between salvation and loss. In the predefining grace of Christ, previous to the actual decision of man, efficacious without detriment to man's freedom, history as such is already decided, in favour of the love of God and the kingdom of God — though the history of salvation of the individual remains open.

b) This predefining, triumphant self-communication of God is not just secretly implanted in the world and its history as its ultimate end. It has been historically manifested in Jesus Christ, his death and resurrection, so that the ultimate ground of the history of salvation and revelation is present and active as an element of history. This is the specific element of the NT in contrast to the OT. The Church, the community which professes faith in, and makes memorial (*anamnesis*) of, this Christ is the presence of this ultimate ground of history. It is the basic sacrament of this predefined salvation of the world (a sign one with and differing from the thing signified). Hence the NT is the "time of the Church". The NT, as the eschatological phase of the history of salvation, revelation, grace, faith and hope as world history continues, is not just patient waiting. It in turn has its own history (see *Church History, Dogma III*), which is not simply identical with the history of salvation and of the world in general, but is the history of the articulate grasp of the ultimate nature and goal of the world.

4. Kerygmatically, two points may be noted.

a) The vast expansion in knowledge of a history of religion which has proved highly diversified leads to the temptation to co-ordinate the time of the NT with past and future religious history. Modern man is inclined to see it as simply a phase, though no

doubt an important one, which can be left behind at some time, though perhaps only by a secularized future ("de-sacralization") in which Christianity dissolves into a worldly, profane self-understanding of man, where "togetherness" or the like reigns. This is a temptation which necessarily follows from the nature of Christian existence (cf. 2 Tim 2:18; 2 Pet 3:3f.). We must remember, nevertheless, that while Christianity has to take on historical forms (in propositional language and social contacts), it sees itself as the "taking up and away" of all worldly religious and anti-religious experiences, including those yet to come, into the mystery of God's incomprehensibility, in the death of Christ and in participation in this death. This is the only way in which the NT claims to be the eschatological time, during which it also criticizes itself in the hope of the kingdom of God. Thus it does not exclude the possibility of new religious and anti-religious experiences. It is ready to face the element of the unforeseeable in them and to integrate them into itself. But it also knows that it has already gone beyond them, not just in the formal dialectic of abstract concepts, but in real participation in the death of Christ. For here, when it is really accepted in faith and hope, the whole religious and anti-religious future of the world is already "passed over" (Jn 5:24; 1 Jn 3:14). The eschatological time has reached the God who is not just a moment of a history which would have to live by virtue of this history as a whole.

b) The modern impression is that history, after an almost incalculable lapse of time, is only now really beginning. There is a planned campaign for the elimination of the self-alienation which social conditions, according to Marxism, have brought about in man, and for the humanization of his environment. For the first time, there seems real hope of success. This could suggest that the time of the NT was a transitory epoch, already in decline, of which the greatest achievement was that it anticipated in abstract theory and mythological formulas what now lies within man's practical grasp. But here the following considerations are in place.

(i) Since God imparts himself to history as its entelechy and goal, this grace of the expectation of the absolute future is not the denial of the seriousness of (profane) history. For this hope — which the individual may refuse — means precisely that all history,

and not just explicitly religious history, is concerned with the absolute future, salvation.

ii) If the history which is now only beginning is *within* the time of the NT, it is actually accorded its greatest possible dimension. Its only limit is the illimitation of God, and its function is to mediate the acceptance of the absolute future of God. For every free act, and not just the religious and cultic act, being salutary because positively moral (though perhaps mostly not recognized as such) serves to mediate the acceptance of the absolute future. This history as a whole, because embraced by the time of the NT, is given the promise that it is not bound for the nothingness of death. And what takes place in it will become, though by means of a radical transformation (1 Cor 15:35-58), the concrete fulfilment in which God will be "all in all" (1 Cor 15:28). The time of the NT proclaims that death will remain in history as its "last enemy" (1 Cor 15:26), but that history is still not bound for death, but for the glory of God, which in the resurrection of Jesus has already begun to take possession of the world. This faith and hope offer the world a standpoint from which to criticize false conservatism and utopias, to which history might otherwise fall victim.

5. For the various writings of the NT, see *Bible A 2, Canon of Scripture, New Testament Books.*

See also *Parousia, Covenant, New Testament Theology II, Grace, Secularization, Marxism.*

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IV. Theology

A. REDEMPTION

1. *The fundamental problem.* a) Redemption objectively presupposes a need of redemption and subjectively the admission (the acceptance) by man of his need. The starting-point must therefore always be the question whether there is such a need of salvation, what constitutes it and how man can be brought to take an honest attitude to this fundamental fact of existence.

(i) In the first place this need for deliverance signifies the condition in which man inescapably finds himself in his own experience, and which he feels to be incomplete, ambiguous and full of suffering. And he feels this to be so in all the dimensions of his reality so that the experience of this state, as both individual and collective, is practically identical with his existence itself. For the Christian interpretation of man, however, this condition does not consist solely in the unavoidable frictions of material, biological, social and personal development. It does not consist solely of social grievances or the finite character of human existence (biological or spiritual). This condition must not, however, be falsely exaggerated to the point of denying the very capacity for salvation, as in the pessimistic existentialism which holds that existence is absolutely and irremediably absurd and that frank recognition of this fact is man's authentic truth. But this attitude can in fact be regarded as a recognition that man cannot save himself. Then the contrary opinion (the Marxist view, whether applied collectively or regarded individualistically) would be the modern form of "superstition" (M. Blondel).

Christianity acknowledges man to be capable of salvation, ultimately because even his freedom is finite and remains comprised within God's creative love. But man is also in need of deliverance, primarily and ultimately from his *guilt*. Certainly a finite guiltless being which had to grow and develop would have felt the pain of incompleteness as a deficiency, in the process of becoming. But the Christian view of man knows that concretely and radically suffering is more than merely "growing pains", and in fact is the manifestation of guilt. And only where guilt is abolished can there be any question of redemption. This guilt, however, both as the state of original sin and

as the action of individual freedom, cannot be removed by man himself. For it is not merely a transgression of certain objective norms belonging to this world. If it were, and if we leave out of account a deeper analysis of freedom as mutual communication between human persons, in which the phenomenon of a guilt impossible to annul by man himself can be experienced, then it would be conceivable that man might be able himself to undo the *consequences* of his transgression, remove his guilt and so finally come to an arrangement with God as the guardian of these regulations concerning creatures. Guilt in the concrete order as "sin" is the free No to God's direct, intimate love in the offer of his self-communication by uncreated divinizing grace and therefore essentially an act which has dialogal character. And because free, it aims at finality, definiteness. Such an act, however, is directed to the absolutely sovereign, free God and is essentially an answer, dependent on God's call and offer. Through a No to divine love of that kind, man of himself can no longer reckon on the continuance of that love, especially as it is the love of the absolutely holy and just God who is the absolute contradiction of such a refusal. Only if that love freely endures even in the face of such a refusal and, as divine and of infinite power to set free, goes beyond that guilt, is forgiveness possible, i.e., is there any possibility of man freely loving, responding in a genuine dialogue, made possible by God. Hence only on the basis of forgiveness of sin is definitive salvation conceivable as personal fulfilment and deliverance from the trials of suffering. For while suffering and death are manifestations of guilt in the depths of existence, complete "beatitude" in all dimensions can only come as the eschatological gift of God. It is not a goal that can be achieved by man himself.

(ii) The experience of humanly ineradicable guilt as the ground of man's need of redemption is felt in very different degrees. That is understandable in view of the existence of man and his situation in the history of salvation. It does not rule out the fundamental assertion of the need for redemption as the condition of understanding Christian soteriology. A merely rudimentary sense of guilt or an apparently total lack of it may itself be culpable repression, "suppression" of the true situation of man (Rom 1:18). It may simply be due to a very primitive

stage of development in the individual, in which a true sense of guilt is not possible. It may be a sign that the powerful (though inarticulate) grace-given sense of living within the domain of divine (forgiving) love to some extent outweighs and overlays the sense of guilt (although in principle both grow in direct proportion). It may be that in some individual the possibility of radical guilt has remained a mere possibility through God's preserving grace, and that this possibility as such is less easily recognized in fact than guilt itself (though that is not necessarily so, as we see from the saints' consciousness of sin). Finally, the profound individual experience always requires an effective example and "catalyst" in the experience of humanity and its history of calamity (especially as interpreted by the revealed history of perdition and salvation). And an individual, culpably or not, may not be sufficiently confronted with this experience in its entirety.

All these factors may be combined in very different ways in the individual and cannot be adequately distinguished by conscious introspection. (For example, concupiscence antecedent to freedom but still inculpable, as opposed to concupiscence which is culpably ratified by freedom, cannot entirely be distinguished by reflection.) Hence there are difficulties regarding the individual sense of guilt, all the more so as many acts are objectively but not subjectively guilty and can be analysed even by the person concerned in terms of his own oppressive past, social factors, etc., and so "cleared up". Methodical guidance is needed to initiate men into the recognition of their guilty situation. Here, however, it is ultimately decisive to understand that this admission of guilt (the manifestation of the "wrath of God"; cf. Rom 1:18) will *in fact* be really radically ventured and achieved only by those who encounter and accept God's forgiveness. The need for redemption is concretely grasped in the act of accepting redemption. Otherwise man does not gauge the radical truth of his guilt, he will deny it or interpret it in some other way. Consequently initiation into the need for redemption is encouragement to believe in the love of God and accept it as unmerited and unconditional (and so therefore not ended by guilt), in the knowledge that even to accept this love is the work of this love.

b) Redemption as Christianity understands

it is "objective". It is an event (act of redemption) with a result (objective fact of being redeemed). These are ontologically prior to the justification and sanctification of man (subjective redemption) and are consequently to be distinguished from it. This distinction is often denied in a modern Christian anthropology of an existentialist kind, for which redemption as such takes place solely in the occurrence of faith, while the latter does not bear on an objective event of *history* prior to the act of faith. The ground of the distinction, however, lies simply in the fact that created, finite freedom even in working out its salvation, presupposes a situation which is not identical with the necessary essence of man and his freedom, a concrete, temporal situation which goes to constitute the real nature of freedom as it is in fact exercised. Objective redemption, therefore, means the constitution by God of that concrete historical situation of freedom in which the will of God to forgive and save is exercised and manifests itself as an offer made to the freedom of man, historically and in eschatological irreversibility; it constitutes the situation on the basis of which and in which alone man can accept in freedom the proffered forgiveness. Why this situation of redemption and forgiveness does not consist simply in a transcendental forgiving will of God, coming to man solely from above, will have to be examined more closely later.

c) For an account of Christian soteriology it is at least not absolutely necessary, and at the present day it is not advisable pedagogically, to distinguish too definitely the grace of God as supernatural divinization and sanctification from the grace of God as forgiveness of guilt (and consequently the original grace of *God* from the forgiving grace of *Christ*). Certainly there is a formal distinction between gratuitous divinization and gratuitous forgiveness (readiness to forgive) on the part of God. But in the concrete order of salvation it is not merely the case that forgiveness is only conferred by divine grace as elevating. We are quite entitled to assume that (i) even divinizing grace as such was given from the start *intuitu Christi*, in view of Christ as the incarnate Word of God. That grace becomes forgiving because God's saving will directed from the start towards Christ as its historical culmination was (freely) absolute, even in face of sin. It is also possible to assume that

(ii) sin, which God could always have prevented in the creation, without detriment to human freedom, was only permitted by God because transcended by his grace. He wished to manifest the victory of his own absolute love even over the refusal of his creature and in the deadly abyss of its futility. From that point of view divinization and forgiveness are two elements, always in fact connected, of the one divine self-communication in uncreated grace to the world, which within its one historical course comprises guilt in order by overcoming it to show itself as a love even greater in its power.

d) For a view of redemption that will be comprehensible today, it is of the greatest importance to announce and present it from the start in such a way that the whole history of mankind always and everywhere stands under God's forgiving love in Christ. The redemptive event of the Cross of Christ will not then appear to be the cause of man's redemption without being the cause of the redemption of pre-Christian mankind or as causing this latter in an entirely different way. Otherwise the preacher lays himself open to the sceptical question of what has changed in the world itself "since" Christ. Because, however, from the beginning God's forgiving self-communication (oriented towards Christ) was always operative in the world, the question of what has changed for the better "since" Christ is badly framed in principle or at all events is a secondary one. We cannot stand empirically outside the *experimentum Christi* and see what the condition of the world would be without Christ. At least a good deal of the betterment of social and human conditions "since Christ" does not demonstrably need to be credited to Christianity, though it would be equally unhistorical to try to overlook a historically tangible "success" of Christianity through its message, all the more so as much in the development of secular civilization derives at least in fact from ultimately Christian motives.

e) Kerygmatically it inevitably leads to misunderstandings if in soteriology the person and the work (death) of Christ are too sharply separated. If in an incarnational doctrine of redemption it is emphasized too onesidedly that mankind was redeemed by the fact of the divine Logos assuming a human nature as member of the one mankind ("quod assumptum est, redemptum est"), then redemption is onesidedly envis-

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aged only under cosmic and objective aspects and Scripture is not taken seriously when it sees the redemptive event in Jesus' love and obedience even to the Cross. If only the latter act is taken into consideration in a "staurological soteriology" (cf. 1 Cor 1:18), and the incarnation regarded merely as the constitution of a subject who is *capable* of redeeming if he posits the requisite action, then soteriology inevitably falls into the purely juridical concepts of an exclusive "satisfaction-theory". The incarnation no longer appears as an intrinsic constituent of the redemptive event itself, redemption remains in a purely "moral" domain and its profoundly world-transforming character is obscured. A theology of the personal subject and of freedom, the specifically personal unity of nature and activity (which cannot be wholly reduced to the common denominator of substance-accident), would have to show that the assumption of a human "nature" by the Logos is the assumption of a "nature" necessarily working in freedom towards its destiny. The incarnation itself is a divine movement which is fully deployed only in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (cf. Jn 3:17; 1 Tim 11:15; D 86: the *descensus* is itself *propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem*).

2. *The Church's teaching on redemption in Scripture, tradition and magisterium.* a) *Scripture.* Only the most fundamental points of scriptural soteriology can be presented here. Much else will be found under other headings (see *Jesus Christ, Mediatorship, Sin, Grace, Justification, Holy Spirit I, Virtue, Resurrection, Ascension*, etc.).

(i) As regards terminology, there is the (negative) expression ἀπολύτρωσις (*redemptio*), setting free from the domination of sin, the "principalities and powers", the Law and death (Rom 3:24; 1 Cor 1:30; Eph 1:7; Col 1:14; Heb 9:15). Positively there is καταλλαγή (*reconciliatio*), restoration of union and peace with God and among men themselves (Rom 5:10f.; 11:15; 2 Cor 5:18ff.; Col 1:20). This redemptive process is characterized in liturgical terms as sacrifice (προσφορά, Θυσία, Eph 5:2; 1 Cor 5:7; Heb 9:25ff.), as expiation (ἱλαστήριον, Rom 3:25), as the shedding of the redemptive blood of the covenant for the many (Mt 26:28 par.; Acts 20:28; Rom 5:9; Eph 1:7; Col 1:20; Heb 9:12, 14; 10:19; 13:12, 20; 1 Pet 1:19; 1 Jn 1:7; Rev 5:9); in more juridical terms as "ransom"

(see above; Mk 10:45; 1 Tim 2:6) or under even more general terms such as "salvation" (Mt 1:21; Jn 3:17; 12:47; 1 Tim 1:15; 2 Tim 2:10; Heb 5:9, etc.). In these no very conscious distinction is drawn between "objective" redemption and its effect, "subjective" redemption.

(ii) This redemption occurs through Christ's death (see 1e above) inasmuch as this is itself an effect of God's redemptive love (Jn 3:16), Christ's free action (Jn 10:15-18) as the accomplishment of his obedience to God, in the acceptance of the lowliness of a human death (Phil 2:7f.), as service and love for man (Mk 10:45; Mt 20:28; Lk 18:27; Jn 13:1). This act is that of the Servant of Yahweh who as the second Adam (Rom 5:12ff. etc.) vicariously (ὑπέρ, ἀντί, περί) acts "in accordance with the Scriptures" for the fellowship of his brethren (Mk 10:45; Mt 26:28 in reference to the "Ebed Yahweh" of Is 53:12, etc.). It is of decisive importance that the historical pre-paschal Jesus himself interprets his death as such an act of redemption (Mt 26:28 par.), even if this only became clear to his community in the light of his resurrection.

(iii) The effects of this redemptive act are liberation from the slavery of sin (Tit 2:14; Eph 1:7; Col 1:14; Heb 9:12ff.), of the Law (Gal 3:13; 4:5; Rom 7:1ff.), of the devil (Jn 16:11; Heb 2:14f.), new creation and rebirth (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; Eph 4:24; Jn 3:1ff.), justification (Rom 5:1, 9, etc.), possession of the Spirit and sonship of God (Gal 3:2ff.; 4:6f.; Rom 8:12-17), truth, life, light, peace, joy (cf. especially Jn). These benefits of redemption, which must of course be understood as grasped in faith and love, are partly already present now (forgiveness of sins, justification, possession of the Spirit, sonship) partly still to come (resurrection of the body: Lk 14:14; 1 Cor 15; glorification: Rom 8:17; vision of God: 1 Cor 13:12; eternal life: Mk 9:43; 10:17, 30; Gal 6:8; Rom 6:22), but these are nevertheless already possessed in the Spirit and in hope, so that only their manifest and permanent possession still remains to come (2 Cor 1:22; 3:18; 5:5; Rom 5:8ff.). The soteriological significance attributed to Jesus' resurrection by Scripture must not be overlooked (e.g., Phil 3:10; Rom 4:25, 8:11; 1 Cor 6:14, 2 Cor 4:14). Emphasis is laid on the universality of this redemption, as against Jewish particularism (see *Salvation I*) and its character of pure grace (Romans, Galatians).

It cannot come through one's own righteous works, but only in faith.

b) *Magisterium and tradition.* (i) On the whole the Church's official pronouncements simply repeat the doctrine of Scripture. See the Creeds; also *D* 122, 319, 550, 790, 795, 938, 940, 951. They also reject Modernism according to which no soteriology is yet found in the gospels themselves, in contrast to Paul (*D* 2038), and condemn Jansenism for denying that salvation is offered to all (*D* 1096, 1294). Redemption is occasionally presented in terms of *satisfactio* (*D* 799, 2318) but without precise explanation of the term (and consequently without solemn definition of the scholastic satisfaction-theory). It is also expressed a few times in terms of "merit" (*meritum*): *D* 552, 795, 799, 800, 802, 820, *DS* 3329. Apocatastasis cannot be taught by appealing to the Cross of Christ (*D* 211). Vatican I envisaged a definition about Christ: "vere et proprie satisfecisse nobisque gratiam et gloriam meruisse" (*Collectio Laencis*, VII, 566c).

(ii) The history of soteriology in dogma contributes little. In the Fathers what is most important (over and above the transmission of biblical doctrine) is Irenaeus's recapitulation theory (mystical-incarnational theory of redemption) which, without denying the Pauline theory of ransom and atonement by the Cross, teaches on the basis of Eph 1:10 the reunion of mankind with God in Christ as the all-embracing head. The only other idea in addition to Scripture in the patristic period, when the concept of expiatory sacrifice was well known from the religious environment, was the theory of men being ransomed from the power of the devil. This was certainly intended in a very metaphorical sense, but included a strongly mythological element. The devil was regarded as having certain proprietary rights over man because of sin, which he lost when deluded, so to speak, by Christ. He wrongly tried to extend his dominion of death over him (so, for example, Origen). In the Middle Ages, under Anselm's inspiration, the satisfaction-theory was worked out. Redemption primarily concerns guilt, which involves an infinite offence against God, because it is measured by the dignity of the person offended. If it is to be made good (and not just forgiven by a free act of God's grace, the possibility of which in principle on God's part is not contested), then this fully adequate (*condigna*) reparation (*satisfactio* =

iniuriae alteri illatae compensatio: Catechismus Romanus, II, 5, 59) can only be effected by a divine person. For the worth of the *satisfactio* is measured by the dignity of the offerer, not by that of the person to whom it is addressed. Such reparation can be made by some person other than the offender on condition that the person offended is willing freely to accept a vicarious satisfaction (*vicaria satisfactio*). In this sense Christ by his obedience even unto death on the Cross presented a fully adequate (*condigna*), infinite (*infinita*), vicarious (*vicaria*) reparation (*satisfactio*) for the infinite offence offered by sin to the holiness and justice of God. And in view of this, God is prepared to forgive man's sin.

Even at the present time theologians are divided as to how precisely to interpret the satisfaction performed by Christ. There is in particular the question how far there belongs to the actual essence of Christ's reparation (which is always essentially Christ's own free action, not, formally speaking, his being punished instead of us) not only the moral dignity of his action giving honour to God, but also formally its factual character as pain and death which is addressed in expiation to the retributive justice of God (*iustitia Dei vindicativa*) precisely as such. Theology also attempts (especially in terms of ideas elaborated to express the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass) to show why and how what happened on the Cross also has the character of a ritual sacrifice, which the eternal High Priest, himself both priest and victim, offered on the altar of the Cross (cf. also *D* 122, 333, 430, 938, 940, 2195, 2274, texts which ultimately simply repeat the statements of Scripture, without settling the question how far Christ's obedience and death must be regarded as a ritual sacrifice in the proper sense).

3. *Soteriology in speculative theology.* a) *Evaluation of the satisfaction-theory.* What this theory positively states is entirely acceptable as a relatively easily intelligible statement of the saving meaning of Christ's death and one which avoids some "mythological" misunderstandings (ransom from the legitimate dominion of the devil, vicarious punishment of Christ, etc.). It can also be read in such a formal way that it can serve to some extent to interpret the whole of soteriology: the loving obedience of the Son is the supreme glorification of God in the world, and for

its sake, in view of it (*intuitu meritorum Christi*), God forgives and loves sinners because he loves them in union with the man Jesus Christ. Nevertheless it is not possible to say that the satisfaction-theory equally and clearly does full justice to all the factors of soteriology. Even from the historical point of view its starting-point is the categories of Germanic law (*offensa — satisfactio; dignitas offensi, satisfaciensis*) and it is not easy to give these a personalist and analogical import so that they can be meaningfully applied to the relation between God and the sinner. Quite simply there is no answer to the question (which does not arise in a purely human transaction of reparation) as to how a moral action can be regarded as compensation for an offence against God, when the action is in any case already absolutely due to God even prior to this function. But that is after all the case with every moral task and action, because in this respect man has nothing which he does not owe to God and the absolute demands of his love. In this matter there can be surely no question of appealing to works of supererogation, all the more so because in that case Christ's Passion would have atoning significance only in certain relative and accidental respects and not as a whole destiny comprising his life and death. In the satisfaction-theory the death of Christ is only the ultimately accidental mode of *any* moral action of the God-man, having no essential connection with the essence of redemption. But that surely does not do justice either to the death of Christ as a saving event as Scripture sees it or to a genuine theology of death in general.

And the satisfaction-theory does not make it plain at once that the initiative comes from God and his unfathomable saving will, so that the Cross is the effect and manifestation of this gratuitous love and not its cause. Here the "person offended" himself ultimately makes reparation by forgiveness and on his own initiative, so that in this system taken *alone* it is not clear that the reparation is not already superseded by forgiveness. If reference is made to other theological parallels (e.g., prayer of intercession as produced by grace itself and yet meaningful), the problem is simply postponed, not solved. Finally, in the satisfaction-theory there is only a very extrinsic connection between the reparation as such and many of the effects of redemption, e.g., resurrection of the body, transfiguration of the cosmos, etc. Yet the redemptive

event must have a more essential unity of origin and effect if it is to appear as the central event of world history, secular and sacred. It must itself from the start penetrate all dimensions of the sinful and redeemable creation. Many accounts of the satisfaction-theory start from rather confused notions of the nature of punishment for sin and the *iustitia Dei vindicativa*. Such approaches cannot be discussed here.

b) *The really fundamental problem of soteriology* is probably that the crucifixion certainly cannot be regarded (as by some modern Protestant theologians, appealing to 2 Cor 5:18–21) as an attestation (directed to us) of God's forgiving love, which moves *us* to believe in this love; it has to be acknowledged as the *cause* of our salvation. On the other hand, if we are not to fall into primitive anthropomorphism, the truth must not be obscured that God is not moved and his mind is not changed by history. What happened on the Cross proceeded from God's forgiving will as its effect, and did not determine that will. Since that is so, the real problem, at least for understanding Christian soteriology in our situation at the present day, is why this original forgiving will of God does not simply effect forgiveness "vertically from on high" in the same way and directly at all points of space and time, but comes to mankind from a definite historical event, which itself is the "cause" of forgiveness.

c) *Systematic soteriology.* (i) The starting-point must be the relation between two elements. One is the salvific will which determines man always and everywhere in the supernatural existential, and offers of God's divinizing and forgiving self-communication to the free personal existence of man. The other is the *history* of salvation and revelation. This "transcendental" saving will of God is not produced by history, but causes history, yet in such a way that this history is the history precisely of the transcendental saving will of God (at least as regards the term on which it bears). This corresponds proportionately to the general relation between human transcendence and human history. The saving will of God is realized, and finds effect among us, by taking historically concrete form, so that in this sense its historical manifestation is its effect and its ground. Saving will and its historical manifestation are not opposed to one another like cause and effect extrinsically related to one

another, but like inner constituents of one whole, and so they mutually condition and form the basis of one another.

(ii) This history of salvation as the concrete accomplishment of God's transcendental saving will, which by the term on which it bears is itself historical, forms a unity. Moreover, it is constituted in its unity by all the dimensions of man (unity of matter as the spatio-temporal "field" of personal history; unity of origin [God]; unity in necessary personal intercourse in community and society; unity of goal of this history [perfect Kingdom of God] as genuine final cause). In this unity of history as that of the transcendental self-communication of God who creates and constitutes history in order to give himself (unity of nature and grace), each factor of history (and so also of the history of every single person) is dependent on every other; the totality of this history (which is united by a real principle, not by an "idea" or "plan" of God) is the situation of the salvation-history (of the "subjective" redemption) of the individual free creature.

(iii) The history of salvation understood in this way as a unity does not consist merely of a series of homogeneous single events of equal importance. It tends towards a victorious culmination which gives a direction to this history which is irreversible. It therefore tends towards an "eschatological" culmination. This culminating point which as goal, as *causa finalis*, supports the whole history of divine self-communication, and in its victorious power brings it to definitive manifestation, is realized when God himself makes this history his own in the God-man (as absolute bringer of salvation) although it is also a history of sin and its historical manifestations (results of sin: domination of death and of the Law), and when this acceptance of the sinful world on the part of God is also answered by acceptance on the part of the world, an acceptance which was predestined in the former. Consequently objectively (in exemplar) and so subjectively, the irreversible acceptance is given and historically manifested as a unity of God and world (in all its dimensions). The radical acceptance of divinizing self-communication on the part of the creature occurs, however, by death. For death, as action, is the definitive acceptance of self by the free being, and, as undergone, it is the acceptance and endurance of the situation of guilt which is that of the

free being. Both acceptances occur and are manifest definitively through the resurrection as the saving fulfilment of death. Since the being and destiny of the God-man as the eschatological culmination of the history of the transcendental saving will of God, is an element in the one single salvation-history of all, history as victorious redemptive *situation* enters for *all* into its eschatological stage and its eschatological manifestation. (This is the case however the individual in his freedom responds to this situation. As long as history continues, the possibility of salvation remains immediately offered and inescapably present and this is something that is not at all a matter of course or necessary.)

(iv) On this basis it is also understandable in what a radical sense the God-man's being and destiny is a glorification of God which means the salvation of the world. The glory of God in the world is not *only* a formal abstract quality of any moral action whatsoever conformable to the will of God. It is the historically irreversible manifestation of God communicating himself as merciful love, which imposes itself victoriously and concretely manifests itself when it transforms the manifestation of refusal of such love, death, into an expression of love in the obedience unto death of the God-man.

(v) Inasmuch as the history of God's transcendent self-communication in the above-mentioned sense (under [i]) is the ground of this saving will itself (because an intrinsic element of this saving will) and this history is based in all its phases on its irreversible goal and culminating point (as *causa finalis*), and unfolds by moving towards this *eschaton*, Christ and his destiny (the complete accomplishment of which appears in the resurrection) are the cause of salvation as historically constituting the historically irreversible saving *situation* for *all*. And yet saving history as a whole (in dependence on its intrinsic *causa finalis*) goes to constitute the salutary situation of the individual. This becomes clear, for example, in the teaching about the Church as mystical body of Christ and *universale salutis sacramentum* (Vatican II: *Lumen Gentium*, art. 48), the treasury of the Church, etc.

The attempt might be made to comprise this saving causality of the Cross of Christ even more clearly in ontologically differentiated terms. Here, however, we can only point to the analogous problem of the

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causality of the sacraments which on the one hand are historical manifestation of grace and precisely by being so are also cause of grace. If in the theology of the sacraments the strict concept of the causality of sacramental signs is formed, and we see that sign (real symbol) and cause are not two simply *de facto* coupled properties of the sacrament but form a radical unity (sign as cause — cause as sign), then this concept of cause might also be applied to the saving event of Christ as the primordial sacrament of redemption.

See also *Sin, Original Sin, Grace, Concupiscence, Salvation I, III A, Incarnation, Death, Modernism, Merit, Apocatastasis.*

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B. SATISFACTION

That the Church of Peter, i.e., the Roman Catholic Church, has been called the "Church of Law" is largely due to the doctrine and practice summed up in the word "satisfaction". The Protestant Churches reject the idea of satisfaction on principle, because it would denote a human work; for the Eastern Churches satisfaction is, if not a completely useless, at all events a relatively unimportant theological opinion.

1. *Scriptural basis.* We must note in the first place that when Catholic theology speaks of satisfaction it is well aware nowadays that no formal statement on satisfaction is to be found in Scripture or in earliest tradition. It is nevertheless possible to speak of its "basis", or "point of insertion" in Scripture. This is found in the terminology of expiatory sacrifice and justice which is used to express the creation and covenant relationship; its essential meaning is fulfilled in Christ's sacrifice on the Cross, which alone makes it intelligible (see *Justice I, Justification*). The recovery of the status of God's children, of being well-pleasing to God, of *eûdoxia*, through the removal of all impurity, is identical with bringing about the possession of justice and the status of belonging to God, appropriate to the exclusive People of God. Justice is not to be understood on the basis of the relation of man to God but solely from God's side, in the light of God's decree which once and for all determined man's state in creation and covenant in relation to Christ as origin and as goal, as possession and lordly status of *eûdoxia*, of Christ's divine sonship and, corresponding to it, man's state of being possessed exclusively by God. But since sin has broken into the world of man, man and his life in all its aspects and domains have to be freed from the perverse situation of possession and domination, i.e., from servi-

tude. He has to be lifted out of sin and its sphere of influence (domination of the devil, of death and of concupiscence) and purified from the traces of the evil past. Expiation as purification from death and corruption is equivalent to being taken possession of by God; in Scripture it is therefore expressed by the image of "ransoming" from a stranger and of "buying back" as God's own absolute possession, giving man legitimate possession of a share in the inheritance of the Son of God. Christ's sacrifice on the Cross is the final decision (verdict, judgment) of God's *eûdoxia* and by God's decree it is the sole and universal operative centre of (active) justification. It is separation from the sphere of dependence on created and above all sinful influences, perfect purification as final liberation from subjection to death and risk of harm (*terminus a quo*) on the one hand and the union of man with God as definitive acceptance and entrance into God's own eternal and inviolable divine life (*terminus ad quem*) on the other. In regard to the terminology of Scripture, which has been thoroughly investigated (see S. Lyonnet), it must be noted that it places the one and universal sacrifice of Christ in relation to the multiplicity of sins and so expresses the solidarity, i.e., the radiation, distribution, concentration and final and permanent inclusion of the many in the one; but it does not express representation as vicarious substitution and transfer. Christ's sacrifice is redemption and repurchase by making men share in, by including them in, the Son of God's inviolable possession of *eûdoxia*. This is equivalent to bestowing perfectly accomplished justice and to drawing men into Christ's perfect sacrificial adoration. It is therefore the glorification of the God of creation and covenant as the absolute Lord and master of human created nature in Christ and through Christ. Thus the justice of the state of creation and covenant which corresponds to God's decree is fulfilled in content from God's side by Christ's sacrifice. God of himself makes man well-pleasing to himself by purifying (reconciling, sanctifying) him, and so makes him just by taking final possession of him. Regarded in this way, "satisfaction" in the scriptural sense we have just outlined, is identical with "redemption", "reconciliation" and similar expressions; the only difference is one of emphasis. The term "to make satisfaction" (*satisfacere*) is seldom used in Scripture and only in a non-theologi-

cal sense (Mk 15:15; Acts 17:9; 24:10). We must therefore inquire why precisely this expression has assumed such predominant importance in theology.

2. History of theology and systematic treatment.

It has been established that the lawyer Tertullian and, after his example, Cyprian of Carthage, introduced the expression "satisfaction" into penitential discipline and so into the theology of the sacraments. Hilary of Poitiers and Ambrose of Milan were the first to try to describe Christ's saving work in this way (see A. Deneffe, J. Rivière, F. Bourassa). Anselm of Canterbury used both the word and concept in dealing with the soteriological problem and so helped to give the idea its central importance in Latin theology. The scriptural vocabulary of justice underwent a marked change of meaning in the Western development. The various terms were placed in quite a different framework of thought and were understood in the light of the principles of the legal system of the society of that age: reparation for offence and propitiation of God's anger achieved on man's side by human action. In the transition from Scripture and the Fathers to the Middle Ages, Christ's redemption was regarded onesidedly in accordance with the Latin juridical mode of thought (influence of Roman Law), and a soteriological system was constructed with the help of moral and juridical concepts centred on the idea of vicarious satisfaction.

a) As opposed to this fundamentally juridical conception, a more ontological and biological view found favour in the Eastern Churches. Adam as physical and moral ancestral head of mankind was the principle of the natural and supernatural life of every individual human being; similarly Christ, only in a much higher and more effectual way. The influence on the part of Christ is not to be regarded as purely extrinsic as though Christ destroyed servitude and its effects by miraculous interventions in the course of human history; it is a question of an immanent operation of grace (*gratia capitis*) which is of such power that it is capable of overcoming all resistances, often compared to illnesses, on condition of course that man does not shut himself off against that operation. Man's liberation does not take place *in instanti* but in a way which corresponds to living processes; if the human body is attacked by viruses which threaten its life,

the doctors seek to activate and intensify the body's powers of resistance in order to restore health from within.

b) Western theology remained attached to juridical modes of thought. It developed in two phases. In the first, the *Ius Romanum* predominated, with its material, quantitative conception: by sin man has "robbed" God of honour (regarded as a *quasi-res*); he must therefore repay this. In the second phase (from Anselm onwards), a personal and qualitative view based more on Germanic law gradually prevailed: honour is a value based on personal dignity; deprivation of honour (an affront) and expressions of honour are to be measured by the dignity of the person involved. Aquinas endeavoured to further the Anselmian view. The objection was raised that it does not fully and completely maintain the character of justice—and this of course is grounded in Scripture itself. Thomas therefore inquired into the various *modi* of Christ's redemptive work, its various aspects, as we would say (*Summa Theologica*, q. 48). He showed that even in the Anselmian view it is possible to speak of genuine justice (*per modum redemptionis*), strict justice (*per modum meriti et satisfactionis*) and indeed of rigorous justice (*per modum sacrificii crucis*). In fact from then on, Anselm's view gradually gained ground in theology so that at the beginning of the 20th century soteriology was dealt with in textbooks exclusively under the aspect of the *modus satisfactionis* (e. g., M. G. van Noort, L. Billot, C. Pesch). For Vatican I a schema on the doctrine of satisfaction had been drawn up but was not discussed further because of the premature closure of the Council (*Collectio Lacensis*, VII, 515, 543).

A distinction is generally drawn between the *quaestio facti* (the satisfaction character of redemption as such) and the *quaestio iuris* (*reparatio moralis*, i. e., satisfaction properly so called as removal of the stain of guilt, and *reparatio expiatoria*, i. e., atonement as payment of the debt of punishment; both are constitutive elements of the idea of satisfaction). The elucidation of the two elements of the concept and of their mutual relationship (co-ordination and subordination) led to the various theories of satisfaction: (i) the old classical punishment-theory (also taken over by the Protestants), which laid such stress on expiation and suffering that the element of actual satisfaction (due to the personal dignity and attitude of the person making

atonement) was pushed into the background; as representative of sinful mankind, Christ had to experience to its full extent the divine anger against the sins of all. (ii) The atonement-theory (C. Pesch, A. d'Alès) replaces the retributive element of expiation by voluntary acceptance of suffering in obedience and love, by which God's good pleasure is drawn down on mankind; an equivalence in extent and intensity between Christ's suffering and the suffering of all sinners is no longer postulated. (iii) The theory of satisfaction which prevails at the present time assumes two forms; common to both is the importance of the moral element of reparation by rendering an honour equal to or greater than what was denied God by the offence of sin. The element of expiation is less prominent and either becomes a secondary though essential element (P. Galthier, J. Solano), or a non-essential yet necessary factor of the work of redemption (J. Rivière, A.-D. Sertillanges, L. Richard).

The difficulty which these theories have to meet is the necessity, testified in Scripture and tradition, of Christ's expiatory suffering; this cannot be brought into a man-made conceptual system and so explained. The stumbling-block of all human speculative constructions is the place of sacrifice (and its meaning and power) in the Christocentric order of creation according to biblical revelation; this transcends the unity of world and salvation in the order of creation. Here human thought is not commensurate with divine thought in the accomplishment of the order of salvation, and cannot by reflection comprehend the actual accomplishment of the redemptive event. The mystery of Christ's Passion and Cross remains absolutely inaccessible to human hypotheses and attempts at systematization.

See also A above.

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C. SOTERIOLOGY

This article does not treat of the salvation of man and the forgiveness of his sin through the action of God in Jesus Christ, but puts forward some methodological considerations on the dogmatic treatise which is or might be called soteriology. Only some pointers can be given here, rather unsystematically. But they have a certain bearing on systematic theology and also on the kerygma — on the way in which the basic dogmas of Christianity which are treated of in soteriology should be proclaimed today.

1. *Soteriology as doctrine of salvation.* Soteriology comes from the word σωτηρια, meaning salvation. This makes the whole of theology a soteriology — since the doctrine about "God as he is in himself", "theology", cannot be adequately distinguished from the history of salvation. And conversely, soteriology cannot be restricted to the doctrine about the forgiveness of sin. A soteriology which would be a sort of mere "hamartiology" should be avoided. Soteriology has also a "supralapsarian" subject-matter, so to speak. For even prior to sin and the forgiveness of sin the salvation of man is not (or would not be) merely man's work, on the basis of the order of creation. It is always the freely-given grace of the self-communication of God — grace not just in the offer but also in the acceptance, which is brought about by this (efficacious) grace of its own nature. Further, there is no difficulty in assuming that even the supralapsarian grace of the state of original justice was the grace of Christ (see *States of Man*). Finally, it may be assumed that the sin of the world was permitted by God only within the framework of a divine decree absolutely predestining the world as a whole to salvation. The infralapsarian economy cannot be regarded, in what would be ultimately an anthropomorphic way, as a second enterprise of God, to make good subsequently the failure of his first plan (in creation and the state of original justice).

Since soteriology is therefore the doctrine of the salvation of man in Jesus Christ, the doctrine of the God-given possibility and reality of man's fulfilment, it must in-

clude from the start all these "supralapsarian" elements. This obligation is underlined by the situation in which the kerygma is today, and which has its historical justification even though it differs from the kerygmatic situation of the Bible. Whether men speak of themselves and their future sceptically with the existentialists or hopefully with the evolutionists, they find it hard or impossible to make the personal sin of the individual the central starting-point of their understanding of man and the world. The pessimist will see his personal guilt before God — if he can think at all in these terms — in the framework of the disruption of the world and man in general. He will see this tragedy as prior to such sin and calling for a justification of God rather than of man. Even a correct theology of original sin would not solve *this* problem, but merely shift it back to the beginning of history. The optimist will regard personal sin — so far as he is open to such a notion — more or less as the almost inevitable "detours" and types of "friction" which must occur in the individual and collective "evolution" of all real history.

Undoubtedly, the existence of an ultimately unavoidable personal decision before God must be remorselessly urged on such mentalities. Undoubtedly too there can be no solution to the *mysterium iniquitatis* in the individual and the world. But justice is done to such minds, and Christian soteriology is effectively preached, only when sin and salvation from sin are placed at once in a wider, supralapsarian context, in the light of which the "permission" of sin can be made intelligible, as far as is possible. (For one must be very cautious, to say the least, about the indemonstrable assertion that God could have prevented sin only by eliminating freedom.) Though man may not use it as a defence of sin (cf. Rom 4:1), it remains true that God permitted sin as the condition of the manifestation of his self-communicating love, which is greater and more unconditional than the offence against it. Man, who must inevitably answer for his free decision, has undoubtedly to distinguish between what God "wills" and what God "permits", to avoid any predestination to sin. But in the nature of things, and particularly in view of a modern notion of God, we may not give the impression that sin simply came as a sort of surprise to God, against his will. In a soteriology which essentially includes the supralapsarian order,

which is really a doctrine of salvation as such, we may avoid the fatal suspicion of thinking of God in so anthropomorphic a way.

2. *Soteriology and Christology.* Soteriology and Christology form a closer unity than normally appears in the handbooks of theology (see *Christology*). We now see more clearly, even in the perspective of the self-understanding of the pre-Easter Jesus, that the best approach to the Christological dogmas is the recognition that Jesus is the historical, eschatological gift of God's salvation to us, the absolute bringer of salvation. It is not surprising therefore that as far as we are concerned, we come more easily from a soteriology to a Christology than vice versa — soteriology here being taken in a comprehensive sense, as the doctrine of the historico-eschatological climax of the history of salvation, the self-communication of God, the dynamism of the world from the start. Saving history (history of σωτηρία) is always there, and Christ is intelligible in its light. It does not begin with him, though in its totality it depends on him also as its end and object.

3. *Hamartiological soteriology.* Insofar as soteriology is the doctrine of divine forgiveness of sin through and in Jesus Christ — as it of course also is, and is essentially — the following points are to be noted.

a) Even when regarded in this way, it must not be simply identified with a doctrine of satisfaction for sin, offered to God through the obedient death of Christ, in the exclusive sense of St. Anselm of Canterbury and subsequent theology. See *Salvation* IV B.

b) It is not advisable, from the biblical, objective and kerygmatic point of view, to begin with a sketch of the hamartiological themes of soteriology, envisaged only in the framework of original sin. What the NT calls the "sin of the world", which is taken away by the redemption brought by Jesus, comprises more than original sin, and implies at once the personal sins of all — with *their* implications for the situation of each with regard to salvation or loss. Original sin, in the classical sense of the Council of Trent, cannot be repented of. This shows that it cannot well be used in the first existentiell summons to man, as if it could arouse him to a sense of his need of redemption. Original sin, the calamitous situation brought about by the *peccatum*

originale originans, where man of himself and by virtue of his origin has no claim to salutary grace, depends rather on soteriology for its "dialectical" character. What is said to be the essence of original sin in the traditional theology of the schools, and placed temporally before the redemption of man ("the deprivation of sanctifying grace, even as offered"), is really what would have been the case if sin and the sinful beginning of mankind had not been comprised within the efficacious salvific will of God in Christ.

c) The treatment of sin, in soteriology or in a special treatise, should aim at an analysis of sin not confined to the pattern of a juridical guilt with regard to sin and punishment or the notion of the absence of sanctifying grace. When "habitual" sin is explained as man's inability to love God perfectly, as the culpable repression of the possibility of transcending himself into God — as long as the prevenient grace of God's liberating love is not there — it could be a way of arousing man's existentiell experience of his sinfulness and hence a sense of his need of redemption.

4. *Cosmic soteriology*. Soteriology should not give the impression that the objective act of Christ's redemption only becomes effective for us and in us when it is accepted freely in baptism or (and) in faith working through charity. The quality of being redeemed — what St. Paul perhaps indicates by *δικαίωσις*, Rom 4:25; 5:18 — "justification", "act of righteousness" — the translations vary — is an "existential" of our existence, defining our structure (just as intrinsically as "original sin") before we ratify it freely in faith, hope and love. See *Existence* III B.

5. *The soteriology of the one humanity*. Soteriology should not merely discuss the opening up of salvation to all, as the sum of the individuals. It must be the soteriology of the one whole race of man as such, and hence again a cosmic soteriology. See *Reign of God, People of God*.

6. *Soteriology and man's self-liberation from "alienation"*. A soteriology which is modern in the right sense should not allow itself to be posed the false dilemma that it has to choose between "self-deliverance" and "rescue". Redemption is of course in all respects the free action of God on man,

caused by nothing outside God — especially as salvation is God himself. But when the basic relationship between God and the world is correctly viewed, excluding any anthropomorphic "synergism", the action of God appears as the possibility and dynamism of the action of the world, which thus moves in self-transcendence to its fulfilment. Here this means that the inner unity of "objective" and "subjective" redemption must be brought out. This need cause no difficulty, since the "objective redemption" in Jesus Christ consists precisely in the subjective act of his obedience in death, in which he gave himself totally to God as member of the human race. When in the light of all that has been said we further assume it is not just the final "mind" of man, the result of his history of freedom, which enters "eternal life", but also the result of his concrete action in the body and the world, though in an unimaginable transformation (1 Cor 15:51f.), world history may well be regarded as humanity's self-liberation from self-alienation. History in this sense takes place in moral action made possible by God's action, as a moment of a rightly understood self-redemption of man, given to mankind by God as its task.

7. *Soteriology as subjective appropriation of salvation*. The distinction between *fides quae* and *fides qua* is well known. If faith is saving faith, and soteriology the doctrine of salvation, soteriology if taken in the full strict sense of the word must also include as a theme the soteriological *fides qua* or the subjective appropriation of salvation. However, most of what is said on this subject is not given in the treatise *De Christo Redemptore* but in other parts of dogmatic theology. This is no harm, and there is no reason to change. Nonetheless, it is well to bear in mind the present considerations, since they could call attention to a number of themes which are not brought out well enough in the ordinary distribution of the material. The traditional doctrine of the *fides qua* remains very abstract, and soteriology speaks ordinarily only of the "objective" redemption. The actual subjective structure of this salutary faith, insofar as it bears on the "objective" redemption and hence (the act being specified by the object) is given a very definite quality, is not sufficiently analysed in itself and in its conditions of possibility in man. It is hardly described

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in such a way that one sees clearly that man has not just to seek the forgiveness of God vertically, so to speak, from on high, but that by the nature of this search for forgiveness he must hope for this redemption horizontally, so to speak, in history.

8. *Soteriology as theology of the death of Jesus.* The death of Jesus has sometimes been regarded, it would seem, as the merely accidental mode of a satisfaction which could have been imagined just as well in other ways. Such a soteriology fails to recognize the central significance of the death of Jesus as such and hence to show the intrinsic redemptive significance of our own death in Christ, the radical and final coming of subjective redemption. See *Death*.

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